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The more things change the more they remain the same.
-French proverb
HIS article reviews and compares changes and clarifications made
by the proposed revisions to U.C.C. Article 2 with the Current
Article 2 sections on contract formation.1 These sections are num-
bered 2-203 to 2-210 in both Current Article 2 and the proposed Revi-
sion. The Revision follows the organization of the existing Article 2
provisions on contract formation and adds some new provisions on elec-
tronic contracting.2 The electronic contracting provisions (R2-211-213)
are not addressed in this article.
The Revision drafts of Articles 1 and 2 used in the preparation of this
article are those dated November 2000 (November 2000 Drafts).3 In this
article, references to sections in the November 2000 Drafts are preceded
by "R," such as R2-207, and references to Current Article 2 are preceded
by "Current," such as Current 2-207.
The Revision takes a conservative approach to revising Article 2.
Thus, it makes few major changes in the contract formation sections. The
major changes it does make occur primarily in R2-207. As in Current
Article 2, the Revision does not attempt to state the complete law of con-
tract formation.4 The focus remains on the bargain in fact of the parties,
not on the contract as determined by strict application of technical legal
rules. Each section of the contract formation provisions responds to a
problem or series of related problems manifested in the case law. Typi-
cally, these problems arose from the application of technical legal rules to
defeat the commercially reasonable expectations of a party. The Revi-
sion does not change the Current Article 2 solutions to most of these
problems.
This article discusses each of the Revised sections from R2-203 through
R2-210. The discussion of each section is divided into separate analyses
of each subsection. These analyses generally note the derivation of the
Revised subsection and the changes and clarifications effected in the Re-
vised subsection. The analysis of R2-207 is lengthier than the other sec-
tion analyses because the changes to that section are more fundamental
and complex than the changes to the other Revised sections.
1. The Revision of U.C.C. Article 2 is scheduled for final approval by its sponsoring
organizations, the American Law Institute (ALl) and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 2001.
2. See U.C.C. §§ 2-204(d), 211-13 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2001).
3. Drafts of the proposed revisions to U.C.C. Articles 1 and 2 are available on the
Internet. See NCCUSL, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, at http.www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2001) (providing these drafts under "drafts").
Each is described as the "November 2000 Draft."
4. For example, there is no mention in Article 2 of a consideration requirement or of
infancy as preventing a contract.
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The reader should also be aware of the Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act (UCITA).5 This act contains contract formation
provisions that are substantially different from those of Current and Re-
vised Article 2. Although UCITA does not directly apply to the sale of
goods, it contains a provision permitting the parties to "opt into" UCITA.
Thus, the parties can have the contract formation provisions of UCITA
(not Article 2) govern, if a material part of the transaction's subject mat-
ter includes computer information. 6 An analysis of the application of the
UCITA contract formation provisions, however, is beyond the scope of
this article.7
II. REVISED 2-203. SEALS INOPERATIVE
The boast of heraldry, the pomp of power,
And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave,
Awaits alike the inevitable hour:
The paths of glory lead but to the grave.
-Thomas Gray
Current 2-203 was not substantially changed in the Revision. This sec-
tion has been amended to substitute "record ' 8 for "writing," and thus
make the section more friendly to electronic contracting.
This section was necessary because special rules applied to sealed in-
struments at common law. For example, a sealed instrument could be
modified only by an agreement under seal, because a seal presumes con-
sideration or dispenses with it; longer or special statutes of limitation ap-
ply to sealed instruments.9 This section abrogates these special rules if
the sealed instrument is a contract for sale or an offer to buy or sell
goods.
5. UCITA is a uniform act promulgated by NCCUSL in 1999. The text cited here is
the 2000 Annual Draft; the Comments are the June 2000 Final Comments. See NCCUSL,
supra note 3.
6. UCITA § 104, cmts. (2000). UCITA also applies to software embedded in goods.
See UCITA § 103(b)(1).
7. To date, UCITA has been enacted in two jurisdictions: Virginia and Maryland. See
UCITA, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/
uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2001). UCITA could
apply, however, even beyond these jurisdictions, because it includes a provision validating
choice of law clauses in contracts. See UCITA § 109(a).
8. "Record" is defined in the Revision. See U.C.C. § 2-103 (34) (Proposed Revision
Nov. 2000). The definition is the same as that in section 9-102(69) of the Revised U.C.C.,
section 102(54) of UCITA, and section 2(13) of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA).
9. See UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, Comments Sections 1-42, inclusive (Feb. 1948)
[hereinafter 1948 Comments]; KARL N. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, Comment on Section 16 [2-4]
Seals Inoperative, at 1, microformed on file J-X(2)(e) (Wm. Hein & Co. 1987).
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III. REVISED 2-204. FORMATION IN GENERAL
The same philosophy is a good horse in the stable, but an arrant jade
on a journey.
-Oliver Goldsmith
Despite its caption, R2-204 is not a comprehensive statement of con-
tract formation rules. Its first three subsections are taken from Current 2-
204 without substantial change. These subsections were designed to ne-
gate applications of the doctrines of offer and acceptance and indefinite-
ness that defeated the obvious intent of the parties to make a contract. 10
R2-204(d) is new; it covers contract formation by electronic agents.
A. R2-204(A) [MANNER OF FORMING CONTRACT]
R2-204(a) is Current 2-204(1) with two minor additions. First, the Re-
vision adds the words "offer and acceptance." The Notes to the May 1,
1998, draft of Revised Article 2 characterize this addition as simply mak-
ing explicit what Part 2 of Current Article 2 intended.11 Second, the Re-
vision also adds the reference to "interaction of electronic agents,"
probably to clarify that electronic contracting is a permissible method of
contract formation.12 This subsection states the obvious principle that
conduct can show agreement. This statement was included in Current 2-
204 because at common law some courts would ignore the parties' con-
duct and focus solely on the writings in determining whether a contract
had been formed. 13
B. R2-204(B) [CIRCUMSTANCES THAT Do NOT PREVENT
CONTRACT FORMATION]
R2-204(b) is Current 2-204(2) without any change. It states that a con-
tract can be formed despite the fact that the time of its making is unde-
cided. According to Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Current
Article 2, this subsection was intended to avoid courts holding that there
was no contract, despite the fact that deliveries had been made, because
the court could not find a writing that qualified as an acceptance.' 4
10. Report and Second Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act, Introductory Comment
on Alternative Sections 3 through 3-J at 64-65 (Dec. 1941) [hereinafter 1941 Introductory
Comment on Alternative Sections 3 through 3-J]; reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRAFTS 344-45 (E. Kelly, ed. 1984) [hereinafter U.C.C. Drafts].
11. U.C.C. § 2-204, n.1 (May 1, 1998 Draft) at http.//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ulc_frame.htm.
12. See U.C.C. § 2-204(d), §§ 2-211-213 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) (regarding
electronic contracting).
13. Cf. 1941 Introductory Comment on Alternative Sections 3 through 3-4, supra note
10, at 5-6 (discussing Alt. Section 3A (1)), reprinted in 1 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 10 at
64-65.
14. See U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. (West 1989); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, Con-
sideration in Committee of the Whole of the Revised Uniform Sales Act, 51-52 (1943),
microformed on file J-V(2)(h) (Wm. Hein & Co. 1987) (discussing subsection 17(2)).
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C. R2-204(c) [WHEN CONTRACT DOES NOT FAIL
FOR INDEFINITENESS]
R2-204(c) is Current 2-204(3) without substantial change. It states that
a contract does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy. 15 In cases of incomplete agreement, mutual conduct evidencing
a contract is commonly the best evidence that the parties intended a con-
tract. 16 The Code gap-fillers usually will supply a reasonably certain basis
for granting a remedy.17
D. R2-204(D) [CONTRACT FORMATION RULES FOR
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING]
R2-204(d) is new. It provides contract formation rules for electronic
contracting, specifically contracts formed by interaction of electronic
agents or by the interaction of an electronic agent and individual. 18
IV. Revised 2-205. FIRM OFFERS
Who'll come a-waltzing Matilda with me?
-Banjo Patterson
R2-205 is Current 2-205 without substantial change. It has been re-
vised to change "signed writing" to "authenticated record"'19 and "form"
to "form record" so the section is more friendly to electronic commerce.
This section was included in Current Article 2 to square the common
law rule on revocability of offers with commercial expectation. At com-
mon law, the offeror normally could revoke its offer before acceptance. 20
Even if the offer contained a promise not to revoke, the offer could be
revoked, unless the promise not to revoke was supported by considera-
tion or detrimental reliance by the offeree.21 This section dispenses with
the requirement of consideration or detrimental reliance and enforces a
promise not to revoke if made by a merchant in an authenticated record.
The offer remains irrevocable for the period of time stated in this section.
15. See UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, Comment on Section 17: Formation in General
at 117-18 (April 27, 1944); reprinted in 2 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 10, 128, 129-30 (dis-
cussing subsection 17(3)).
16. See U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. 3, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
17. See id., para. 1.
18. The Uniform Electronic transactions Act (UETA) and the federal Electronic Sig-
natures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-Sign"), 15 U.S.C 7001 et seq. (2000)
also govern electronic contracting. To the extent permitted by E-Sign, revised Article 2
supercedes E-Sign. See U.C.C. § 2-104(d) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). UETA is a
uniform act promulgated by NCCUSL in 1999. The text of UETA is available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm.
19. "Authenticate" is defined in the Revision. See U.C.C. § 2-102(1) (Proposed Revi-
sion Nov. 2000). Similarly, "record" is also defined in the Revision. See id. § 2-102(34).
20. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 158 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter FARNS.
WORTH, CONTRACTS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 42 cmt. a (1981).
21. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 20, at 180-81; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 42 cmt. a (1981).
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V. REVISED 2-206. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Technique without ideals is a menace;
ideals without technique is a mess.
-Karl N. Llewellyn
R2-206(a) and (b) are essentially unchanged from Current 2-206(1) and
(2). Revised 2-206(c) is based on Current 2-207(1). This section is not
intended to be a complete codification of offer and acceptance law. The
purpose of Current 2-206 was to negate several uncommercial applica-
tions of the offer and acceptance doctrine. The applications negated are
detailed under the relevant subsection discussions below.
A. R2-206(A)(1) [MANNER AND MEDIUM OF ACCEPTANCE]
R2-206(a)(1) is Current 2-206(1)(a) rephrased without substantial
change. This subsection states that any manner or medium of acceptance
reasonable under the circumstances is a proper manner or medium of
acceptance. It is intended to displace technical rules of acceptance, such
as requiring a telegraphed offer to be accepted by telegraph, in favor of
rules based on commercial reasonableness. 22
B. R2-206(A)(2) [MANNER OF ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER CALLING FOR
PROMPT OR CURRENT SHIPMENT; ACCEPTANCE BY SHIPMENT
OF NON-CONFORMING GOODS]
R2-206(a)(2) is Current 2-206(1)(b) rephrased without any change.
The first half of the subsection states that an offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment can be accepted either by a prompt promise
to ship or by prompt shipment. At common law, courts tended to find
that an offer permitted only a single manner of acceptance. This half of
the subsection makes clear that either a return promise or performance is
a permissible manner of acceptance for this kind of offer.23
The second half of this subsection, dealing with acceptance by shipment
of non-conforming goods, is intended to eliminate the so-called "unilat-
eral contract trick."' 24 At common law, performance in response to an
offer was not acceptance of the offer unless the performance conformed
to the terms of the offer.25 Consequently, the seller's shipment of goods
that were unintentionally non-conforming would not be an acceptance; it
would be a counter offer. Thus, when the buyer discovered the non-con-
formity, it would have no claim against the seller.2 6 To avoid this undesir-
able result, the subsection provides that shipment of non-conforming
goods is an acceptance of the buyer's offer, unless the seller seasonably
22. See U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
23. See id. at § 2-206 cmt. 2.





notifies the buyer that the goods are offered only as an accommodation
to the buyer.
C. R2-206(B) [WHEN NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE BY BEGINNING
PERFORMANCE Is REQUIRED]
R2-206(b) is Current 2-206(2) without change. It indicates that begin-
ning performance can be a reasonable mode of acceptance and requires
that the offeror be notified of the acceptance within a reasonable time. If
timely notification is not given, the offeror may treat the offer as having
lapsed before acceptance.
D. R2-206(c) [EFFECT OF DEFINITE AND SEASONABLE EXPRESSION
OF ACCEPTANCE CONTAINING TERMS ADDITIONAL TO OR
DIFFERENT FROM THE OFFER]
R2-206(c) has been transferred from Current 2-207(1) with some
changes. This transfer reflects the decision that R2-207 will cover only
contract terms, not contract formation issues.27 R2-206(c) determines
whether a contract has been formed by a response that does not match
the offer. This issue arises primarily (but not exclusively) in the "Battle
of the Forms."'2 8 If a contract has been formed under R2-206(c), the
terms of that contract are determined by R2-207.
R2-206(c) follows the phrasing of Current 2-207(1) by stating that a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance in a record operates as
an acceptance, even if it contains terms additional to or different from the
offer. R2-206(c) continues the policy of Current 2-207(1) by rejecting the
common law mirror image rule. 29
R2-206(c) omits the last clause of Current 2-207(1). That clause pre-
vented a definite expression of acceptance from being an acceptance if it
was "expressly made conditional on assent to the different or additional
terms" in the acceptance. 30 Comment 5 to Revised 2-206 indicates this
clause was omitted from the Revision because it was unnecessary.3 1
27. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
28. For examples of non-form offer and acceptance contracts covered by Current 2-
207, see the third paragraph of the second comment to R2-207 and the first comment to
Current 2-207. See also, John D. Wladis, U.C.C. Section 2-207: The Drafting History, 49
Bus. LAW. 1029, 1036-38 (1994).
29. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 5 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). The mirror image rule re-
quired that a response match ("mirror") the offer to be an acceptance. See, e.g., JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 30-31 (5th ed. 2000) [here-
inafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
30. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1) (West 1989).
31. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 5. Karl Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of Current Article 2,
also believed that the clause was unnecessary. Explaining why the clause appeared in the
comments, but not in the text of a prior draft of Current 2-207, he stated: "a document
which said, 'This is an acceptance only if the additional terms we state are taken by you' is
not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance ...." See Karl N. Llewellyn, Steno-
graphic Report of Hearing on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Held at the House
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, (Feb, 15, 1954), reprinted in 1 N. Y. L.
REV. COMM'N. REP. HEARINGS OF THE U.C.C. 116-17 (1954).
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Thus, R2-206(c) continues the rule that a response to an offer is not a
definite expression of acceptance if it is an expressly conditional
acceptance. 32
Two important questions will now be addressed: (1) What is a "definite
expression of acceptance?" and (2) What language is necessary to make
the acceptance conditional?
1. Definite Expression of Acceptance
What is a definite expression of acceptance under R2-206(c)? First, a
response to an offer cannot be a definite expression of acceptance if the
response is expressly conditioned on the offeror's assent to the terms in
the response.33 Second, the response need not match the offer to be a
definite expression of acceptance. The text of R2-206(c) indicates that
the response can be a definite expression of acceptance, even though it
contains terms additional to or different from the offer.
How much variance from the offer is permissible for a response still to
be a definite expression of acceptance? Revised Comment 5 makes this
general observation: "Subsection (c) rejects the mirror image rule, but
any responsive record must still be fairly regarded as an 'acceptance' and
not as a proposal for such a different transaction that it should be con-
strued to be a rejection of the offer."'34 The text and comments of R2-206
do not elaborate.
The phrase "definite expression of acceptance" originated in Current 2-
207(1). Its use in R2-206(c) suggests that the authorities construing this
phrase in Current 2-207 can continue to provide guidance under the Revi-
sion. Case law and commentary under Current 2-207 establish guidelines
for determining when a response to an offer is a definite expression of
acceptance. These guidelines indicate that correspondence between the
non-form terms in both the offer and the response is important while
correspondence between the form clauses is not important. Thus, a re-
sponse that matches the non-form terms in the offer can be a definite
expression of acceptance, even though the response contains form clauses
that add to or conflict with form clauses in the offer.35 Second, a re-
sponse that matches the non-form terms in the offer can be a definite
expression of acceptance, even though the response is a pre-printed form
that was not drafted to be an acceptance. 36 Third, a response can still be
a definite expression of acceptance even if it contains minor non-form
32. See U.C.C. 2-207 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). A conditional acceptance
is not an acceptance; it is a counter offer. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at
39.
33. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
34. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 5 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
35. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (6th Cir.
1972); C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F. 2d 1228, 1234-35 (7th Cir.
1977) (citing Dorton, 453 F.2d at 1166, 1168). Cf. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1. See WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 33; Wladis, supra note 28, at 1046.
36. Courts construing Current 2-207(1) sometimes find purchase order forms drafted
as offers to be definite expressions of acceptance. See, e.g., Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp.,
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terms that add to those in the offer. 37 Lastly, a response containing terms
that conflict with non-form terms in the offer is not normally a definite
expression of acceptance.38 The general observation quoted above in Re-
vised Comment 5 does not contradict any of these guidelines.
2. The Expressly Conditional Definite Expression of Acceptance
Under Current 2-207(1), a definite expression of acceptance containing
terms additional to or different from the offer forms a contract, "unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms" in the acceptance. 39 This "unless" clause has been omit-
ted from the Revision because it is unnecessary. 40 Thus, a response that
contains such conditional language would not be a definite expression of
acceptance under R2-206(c). Given that some courts have construed re-
sponding forms drafted as offers to be definite expressions of accept-
ance,41 it is crucial that proper conditional language be included in any
form to prevent a response intended as a counter offer from being con-
strued as an acceptance.42
What language is sufficient to make a record expressly conditional?
Under Current 2-207, courts usually require the language of the record to
express clearly an unwillingness to proceed with the transaction, absent
an agreement to the terms in the record.43 Language that tracks the "un-
less" clause of Current 2-207(1) is sufficient 44 (but not required) 45 to
make the acceptance expressly conditional. Language indicating that an
acceptance is "subject to" the terms in the acceptance should not be used,
because this phrasing usually has been found not to satisfy the expressly
741 F.2d. 1569 (10th Cir. 1984); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924
(9th Cir. 1979).
37. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (West 1989); cf. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 3 (Proposed
Revision Nov. 2000). Typically these minor terms will specify particulars of performance.
See Wladis, supra note 28, at 1036-38.
38. See, e.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1993); Herm Hughes &
Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Courts sometimes overlook this
requirement. See, e.g., St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. A.B.I. Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d
83 (N.D. 1985) (holding that acceptance changed price retainage term); Southern Idaho
Pipe and Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe and Supply, Inc., 567 P.2d 1246 (Ida. 1977) (holding that
acceptance changed delivery date).
39. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (West 1989).
40. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 5 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
41. See Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d. 1569 (10th Cir. 1984); Idaho Power
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979).
42. See, e.g., Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 185-86, 189 (1st Cir.
1997) (holding that acknowledgement form stating "counteroffer" is confirmation of order,
not counteroffer and holding the form to be conditional).
43. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 101 (3rd Cir. 1991);
Ralph Schrader, Inc. v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 833 F.2d 1210 (6th Cir. 1987); Diatom, Inc. v.
Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984).
44. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 39; see also Lee R. Russ, Annotation,
What Constitutes Acceptance "Expressly Made Conditional" Converting It to Rejection and
Counteroffer under Section 2-207(1), 22 A.L.R. 4th 939 § 2(a) (1983).
45. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185, 1191 (8th




By omitting specific language dealing with expressly conditional re-
sponses, the Revision creates some uncertainty, because it removes the
forms drafters' safe harbor of tracking the Current 2-207(1) "unless"
clause in their forms. Under the Revision, courts might find language
that tracks the omitted Current 2-207 "unless" clause to be insufficient to
indicate that a party is unwilling to proceed with the transaction absent
an agreement to its terms. Conversely, the lack of specific statutory lan-
guage might cause courts to be more flexible in finding a wider variety of
phrases to be effective conditional language.
VI. REVISED 2-207. TERMS OF CONTRACT; EFFECT
OF CONFIRMATION
Anyone who isn't confused really doesn't understand the situation.
-Edward R. Murrow
A. INTRODUCTION
R2-207 states the terms of a contract covered by Revised Article 2.
The section consists of six parts. The first three parts, R2-207(i)-(iii), in-
dicate when the section applies. The last three parts, R2-207(1)-(3), indi-
cate the terms of the contract. R2-207 is based on Current 2-207, but
makes some significant changes.
Current 2-207 dealt with the effect of different or additional terms in
an acceptance or confirmation. 47 A confusing body of pre-Code case law
developed concerning the exchange of non-matching correspondence
when the parties subsequently acted as if they had a contract. 48 The
problem of non-matching correspondence grew more pressing as business
began to be conducted increasingly by the exchange of pre-printed
forms.49 This process became known as the battle of the forms. The par-
ties exchanging forms would usually agree on the handwritten or typed
terms (filled-in terms) on the forms, such as description of the goods,
quantity, and price. Because each party's form also contained pre-
46. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron and Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d 103,
113, n.12 (7th Cir. 1979); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 926-
27 (9th Cir. 1979); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972).
47. Current 2-207 is one of the more heavily litigated sections of Current Article 2. It
has generated hundreds of reported cases. See U.C.C. CASE DIGEST 2207 (West 1997).
48. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum Replying to the Report & Memorandum of
Task Force I of the Special Comm. of the Commerce & Indus. Ass'n of N.Y. on the U. C.C.
(August 16, 1954), reprinted in 1 N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP. HEARINGS OF THE U.C.C.
106, 119-20 (describing the confused state of law concerning written confirmations); Karl
N. Llewellyn, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Article 2 of the U.C.C. (Feb. 15, 1954),
reprinted in 1 N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP. HEARINGS OF THE U.C.C. 119 (1954) (alluding to
the "completely confused body of present case law" on qualified or conditional
acceptance).
49. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Stenographic Report of Hearing on the U.C.C. (May 3,
1954), reprinted in 2 N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP. HEARING OF THE U.C.C. 19-23 (1954)
(describing the battle of the forms).
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printed clauses (form clauses) favoring the party who drafted the form,
the pre-printed terms would not match.50 Typically, the parties would
proceed to perform without resolving the discrepancies in the pre-printed
terms.51 If disputes developed later over those terms, courts often (but
not always) would apply the "Last Shot Rule."'52 This usually resulted in
the buyer being held to have assented to the seller's terms by accepting
the goods.
Current and Revised 2-207 are designed in part to regulate the battle of
the forms. Current 2-207 rejected theories such as the last shot rule that
resulted in one side winning the battle of the forms. Instead, it opted for
a "neutrality principle," under which neither side's form prevails.53 Re-
vised 2-207 continues this neutrality principle. Thus, under Current and
Revised 2-207, the terms of a contract resulting from the battle of the
forms consist primarily of the terms mutually agreed upon (typically the
filled-in terms on the forms) and terms supplied by Article 2.54 The justi-
fication for this neutrality principle presumably is that form clauses are
often unread and undiscussed, and variances between the forms are ig-
nored by the parties as performance of the contract begins. 55
Revised 2-207 also continues the tripartite framework of contract for-
mation methods in Current 2-207. When variant writings are exchanged,
a contract might be formed by one of three methods. First, an informal
agreement might precede the sending of non-matching written confirma-
tions of the agreement ("Confirmation"). 56 This method applies when
the parties have made an informal agreement (for example, by tele-
phone)57 and subsequently one or both parties confirms the agreement in
a writing that contains terms not discussed.58 The second method of con-
tract formation is described variously as "Offer and Acceptance" 59 and as
"Definite Expression of Acceptance. ' 60 This method applies when there
is no prior informal agreement and the exchange of non-matching writ-
ings produces a contract. Under this method, a contract results when a
writing that responds to an offer is an unconditional definite expression
50. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (West 1989).
51. See id.
52. See John L. Gedid, A Background to Variance Problems Under the U.C.C.: Toward
a Contextual Approach, 22 Duo. L. REv. 595, 612-32 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th
Cir. 1986).
54. U.C.C. § 2-207(3), cmt. 6 (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-207()-(3) (Proposed Revision
Nov. 2000).
55. See 1948 Comments, supra note 9; General Comment on Part II: Formation and
Construction, 14-15, 17, reprinted in A.B.A. Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990,
Preliminary Report of the U.C.C. Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 at 1251,
app. a (1991) [hereinafter General Comment]; see, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. El Paso Pipe &
Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992).
56. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-207(iii) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
57. See Llewellyn Memorandum, supra note 48, at 119.
58. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) cmt. 1 (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-207(iii) (Proposed Revision
Nov. 2000).
59. U.C.C. § 2-207(ii) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
60. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-206(c) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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of acceptance, despite containing terms that do not match the offer. 61
The third method of contract formation occurs when a contract is inferred
from the mutual conduct of seller and buyer ("Mutual Conduct Con-
tract"). 62 This method applies chiefly when no contract has been formed
before or by the exchange of writings, yet the seller has delivered and the
buyer has accepted the goods.63
The remainder of this section analyzes the provisions of R2-207. The
analysis is organized as follows: (1) an overview of the major changes and
clarifications made by R2-207; (2) a description of contract terms under
R2-207; (3) a description of the differences in contract terms under Cur-
rent and Revised 2-207; and (4) advice for navigating the battle of the
forms.
B. OVERVIEW OF MAJOR CHANGES AND CLARIFICATIONS
MADE BY R2-207
1. R2-207 Deals Only With Contract Terms, Not Contract Formation
Current 2-207 covers both contract formation and the terms of a con-
tract formed under that section. R2-207 deals only with the terms of the
contract. The Revision moves the contract formation rules of Current 2-
207 into the contract formation sections of the Revision (R2-204 and 206)
with no substantial change in those rules.64
2. R2-207 States the Terms of Any Contract Formed Under Revised
U. C.C. Article 2, Not Just A Contract Involving Non-
Matching Writings
R2-207 covers any contract formed under Revised Article 2.65 Current
2-207 covers only contracts when there are different or additional terms
in an acceptance or confirmation.66 R2-207 thus casts a wider net than
Current 2-207.
3. What Are the Terms of the Contract?
The Revision can result in substantially different contract terms than
Current 2-207. First, under R2-207 the terms of the contract are the same
regardless of how the contract was formed. The terms of a contract could
differ under Current 2-207, depending on which method of contract for-
mation applied and who sent the first form. The justification for this
change in the Revision is to eliminate any strategic advantage to sending
61. See U.C.C. 2-207(1) cmt. 1 (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-207(ii) (Proposed Revision
Nov. 2000). See infra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing when a response is an
unconditional definite expression of acceptance).
62. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-207(i) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
63. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) cmt. 1 (West 1989).
64. U.C.C. §§ 2-204-206, § 2-207 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
65. Id.
66. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (West 1989).
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the first or last form.67 The most significant difference resulting from this
change is in the terms of a contract made by an exchange of forms. The
Revision adopts the "Knock Out Rule," so that conflicting terms in the
offer and the definite expression of acceptance knock each other out and
the contract is formed on the matching terms in each form.
A second source of different terms is a change in the procedure used to
determine whether a party has agreed to the other's terms. The Revision
states that terms enter the contract if both parties agree to them.68 Com-
ment 2 to R2-207 provides guidelines indicating when a party does and
does not agree to the other side's terms. These provisions differ signifi-
cantly from Current 2-207(2) and Current Comments 3 and 6. The pri-
mary difference is that courts have more discretion under the Revision to
include or exclude terms.69 Other differences in terms arising from these
changes are discussed below. 70
4. Neutrality Principle Does Not Apply If Buyer Accepts Goods
Without Sending A Record
Under R2-207, the neutrality principle does not apply in certain situa-
tions when the buyer has not used a record. For example, a buyer might
order goods by telephone. The seller proceeds to ship the goods together
with its terms, and the buyer accepts the goods.71 The comments to R2-
207 indicate that, if no contract was made before the buyer accepts the
goods and the buyer did not send a record, the buyer will normally be
deemed to have agreed to the seller's terms when the buyer accepts the
goods.72 This result is consistent with normal offer and acceptance law as
well as the court's holding in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.73 It will adversely
affect consumers and other buyers who do not use their own forms.74
5. Contract Terms Otherwise Included by R2-207 Are Subject to the
Parol Evidence Rule
R2-207 states that the contract terms stipulated in R2-207 are subject to
R2-202 (the "Parol Evidence Rule"). This reference, which did not ap-
pear in Current 2-207, was undoubtedly necessitated by the broadening of
R2-207 to cover all contracts of sale, not just contracts associated with the
exchange of non-matching records. The exchange of non-matching
records rarely involves parol evidence issues because there is usually no
one record that is a final expression of the parties' agreement. Under the
broadened scope of R2-207, such a final expression could well exist. The
67. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
68. See id. at 2-207(2).
69. See id. at 2-207 cmt. 2.
70. See discussion infra Parts VI.D.
71. The Revised Comment gives the less common example of the buyer making an
offer in a record. The seller then ships without enclosing any record of its own.
72. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
73. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
74. See discussion infra Part VI.C.2, note 113 (discussing this issue further).
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reference to R2-202 means that parol evidence of terms that would nor-
mally be part of the contract under R2-207(2) could be excluded by the
parol evidence rule.
C. CONTRACT TERMS UNDER R2-207
R2-207(1)-(3) list three types of terms that are part of any contract
formed under Revised Article 2. These types are: (1) terms that appear
in the records of both parties; (2) terms, whether in a record or not, to
which both parties agree; and (3) terms supplied or incorporated under
any U.C.C. provision.75 This section of the article identifies the source
and analyzes the content of each type of term.
1. R2-207(1): Terms in the Records of Both Parties
According to R2-207(1), the terms of the contract include "terms that
appear in the records of both parties. '76 This subsection is derived with-
out substantial change from Current 2-207(3) and Comment 6 to Current
2-207. The rationale is obvious: if both records contain the same term, it
is evident that the parties have mutually agreed to that term. Therefore,
this subsection will include in the contract the filled-in terms on the forms
to the extent those terms agree. Revised Comment 2 indicates that im-
material variances in two terms do not prevent those parts of the terms
that agree from entering the contract. 77
2. R2-207(2): Terms to Which Both Parties Agree
R2-207(2) provides that the contract terms include "terms, whether in a
record or not, to which both parties agree" (the "Agrees to the Terms"
Test). 78 This provision is new. Current 2-207(2) required an express
agreement 79 or, in some instances, assent by silence before one party's
term could enter the contract. R2-207(2) essentially substitutes the
"agrees to the terms" test for these provisions of Current 2-207. The Re-
vision makes this substitution to give courts greater discretion to include
or exclude terms.80 Greater discretion, however, comes at the cost of
predictability. To minimize this cost, the drafters of the Revised Com-
ments included guidelines on when an agreement to terms exists under
R2-207(2). 81
What are the similarities and differences in terms to be included in the
contract under Current 2-207 and Revised 2-207(2)? An express agree-
ment to a term makes that term part of the contract under both Current
75. See U.C.C. §§ 2-207(1)-(3) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
76. Id. § 2-207(1).
77. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 4 (referencing arbitration clauses).
78. Id. § 2-207(2).
79. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (West 1989).




and R2-207. 82 Similarly, assent manifested by conduct indicating accept-
ance of a particular term is also effective to make the term part of the
contract under both Current and R2-207. 83 Finally, usage of trade, course
of dealing and course of performance can supply terms under both Cur-
rent and Revised Article 2.84
Assent by silence or by performance appears to be treated differently
under Current and Revised 2-207. This is a vitally important issue and
one that will be frequently litigated. When forms are used there is usually
no verbal or written assent or conduct regarding particular terms. The
recipient of the form will simply proceed to perform. Whether that per-
formance constitutes an agreement to the form will determine whether
the terms in the form or the neutrality principle governs.
Current 2-207(2) governs assent to terms by silence. It applies when a
contract has been formed and one or both parties propose additional
terms for inclusion in the contract. In contracts between merchants, this
provision makes the proposed additional85 terms part of the contract if
they do not materially alter86 the contract and they are not objected to by
the other party. Thus, assent is presumed from silence if the proposed
terms do not materially alter the contract. 87 If the proposed terms mate-
rially alter the contract, express assent to them is required. 88 Therefore,
this "materially alters" test delineates when assent to proposed additional
terms is presumed by silence and when it is not.
The "materially alters" test is premised on two factual assumptions.
First, form clauses are usually not read, even by merchants.8 9 Second,
82. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (West 1989) with U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 3
(Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
83. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) with Wau-
kesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
failure to claim consequential damages in prior deals indicates assent to term excluding
such damages in current deal); Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v. McCann Const. Special-
ties Co., 916 F.2d 412, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1990) (continuing to place orders after objection to
term has been rebuffed indicates assent to term); but see Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1986).
84. Compare U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (West 1989) with U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (Proposed Revi-
sion Nov. 2000) and id. 2-207, cmts, 2 and 4.
85. The drafters' intent was that different (as opposed to additional) terms in a confir-
mation or acceptance could never become part of the contract under the special merchants
rule of Current 2-207(2). The conflicting term in the contract or offer was deemed to be an
objection to the different term in the confirmation or acceptance. Consequently, Current
2-207(2)(c) would always be satisfied as do the different term. Thus, the different term
could never enter the contract under Current 2-207(2). See William B. Davenport, To Par-
aphrase Mark Twain, The Claim of a Printer's Error in UCC Section 2-207 is Greatly Exag-
gerated, 28 UCC L.J. 231 (1996); see also Wladis, supra note 28, at 1050.
86. Current Comment 4 to section 2-207(2) states that a term materially alters the
contract if it "results in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by
the other party." U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (West 1989). Current Comments 4 and 5 give exam-
ples of common form clauses that do or do not materially alter the contract. See id. § 2-
207, cmts. 4, 5.
87. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 6.
88. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 3.
89. See 1948 Comments, supra note 9, General Comment on Part I1: Formation and
Construction, at 14-15, 17 reprinted in A.B.A. Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1,
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some form clauses are reasonable while other form clauses are unreason-
ably one-sided. 90 The purpose of this test was to permit the unread rea-
sonable clauses (form and non-form) to enter the contract by silence, 91
while protecting against inadvertent assent by silence to unread one-sided
form clauses. 92 This test applied not only to contracts formed under Cur-
rent 2-207(1), but also to contracts arising from the battle of the forms
under Current 2-207(3).93
The "materially alters" test was intended to provide guidance in place
of the confused and unpredictable pre-Code case law dealing with form
clauses.94 This test has been relatively successful in introducing order
into the case law. Although courts differ on the treatment of some
clauses, 95 the guidance provided by Current Comments 4 and 5 has gen-
erally produced reasonable consensus in the case law on what terms "ma-
terially alter."
a. "Agrees to the Terms" Test
R2-207(2) replaces these provisions with an "agrees to the terms" test.
The Revision makes this change to give "the court greater discretion to
include or exclude certain terms than original Section 2-207 did."' 96 Pre-
sumably, the basis for finding agreement to terms under R2-207(2) is as-
sent to the terms manifested by words or conduct.97
Revised Comment 2 provides four guidelines for determining when
performance constitutes an agreement to the other party's terms under
R2-207(2). These guidelines will now be briefly summarized and then
each guideline will be discussed in detail. Basically if a party has sent its
own record, that party's' performance is not agreement to terms in the
1990, Preliminary Report of the U.C.C. Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981,
1251 app. a (1991) [hereinafter General Comment]; see, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. El Paso Pipe
& Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992). The empirical evidence appears to
support the assumption that forms often are not read. See D. Keating, Exploring the Battle
of Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 at 2703-04 (2001); J. Murray, The Chaos of the
'Battle of the Forms': Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1317-18, n. 47 (1986); S. Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 59-62
(1963).
90. See General Comment, supra note 89, at 17.
91. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (West 1989); 1948 Comments, supra note 9, § 20, at 2-3, 5
("The provision of this section that silence leads to the incorporation of reasonable addi-
tional terms into the contract .... ); General Comment, supra note 89, at 16-17.
92. General Comment, supra note 89, at 17; 1948 Comments, supra note 9, § 20, at 2-3.
93. See, e.g., Join, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 151 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1998); Wladis,
supra note 28, at 1048. Courts sometimes assume that contract terms under Current 2-
207(3) do not include Current 2-207(2). See, e.g., P.S.C. Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. The
Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2000).
94. Llewellyn 1954 Memorandum, supra note 48, at 119-20.
95. See, e.g., Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375 (5th
Cir. 1981); Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1987)
(demonstrating the courts' inconsistent treatment of arbitration clauses); Transamerica Oil
Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983); Kathenes v. Quick Check Food Stores,
596 F. Supp. 713 (D.N.J. 1984) (demonstrating the courts' inconsistent treatment of rem-
edy limitation clauses).
96. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
97. Cf. id. § 2-207 cmt. 2.
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other party's record, unless course of performance, course of dealing or
trade usage treat the other party's terms as part of the agreement. 98 If a
party has not sent its own record, and no contract has been formed before
its performance, the performing party will be deemed to have agreed to
the other party's terms.99 If a contract had been formed before receipt of
the other party's terms, performance is not agreement to the other party's
terms.100
The guidelines thus draw two distinctions. First, when was the contract
formed relative to receipt of the terms. Second, did the performing party
send its own record to the other party. If an initial agreement has been
made and terms follow, the second guideline indicates that performance
by the receipt of the terms should not normally be construed as its agree-
ment to those terms. 101 Course of performance, course of dealing or
trade usage can, however, cause the terms received to be part of the
agreement under the fourth guideline. 102
If there had been no initial agreement before the terms were received,
the guidelines make a distinction based on whether the recipient of the
terms sent its own record. If the recipient did send its own record, the
first guideline indicates that the recipient's performance should not nor-
mally be regarded as its assent to any terms it received from the other
side, unless course of performance, course of dealing or trade usage
makes the terms part of the agreement.10 3 If the recipient did not send its
own record, the third guideline indicates that performance by the recipi-
ent after receiving the other side's terms should normally be treated as its
agreement to those terms.'0 4
i. First Revised Guideline: No Agreement to Terms By
Performance When Both Sides Send Records
The first guideline of Revised Comment 2 states that "a party who
sends a record ... with additional or different terms should not be re-
garded as having agreed to any of the other's additional or different
terms by performance.' ' 0 5 This guideline protects any party who sends a
record against being held to have agreed to the other party's terms
merely by performing. In effect, a party's record is treated as an assent to
the terms contained in it and no others. This guideline presumably covers
the battle of the forms, and it affirms the neutrality principle: neither
party's terms control. This is the same result as under Current 2-207(3).
Note that under this revised guideline, additional terms in the other
party's record are excluded from the contract even if an objection is not
98. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, paras. 1, 4, cmt. 3.
99. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 2.
100. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 1.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 4, cmt. 3.
103. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 2, 4, cunt. 3.
104. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 2.
105. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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made. This is a change from Current 2-207, which included additional
reasonable terms in the contract if no objection was made. 10 6
The fourth guideline indicates that trade practice, course of dealing or
course of performance might treat performance as an agreement to the
other party's terms even though the performing party sent its own
record. 107
ii. Second Revised Guideline: No Agreement By Performance to
Terms Received After Original Agreement Is Made
The second guideline of Revised Comment 2 provides that "perform-
ance after an original agreement between the parties (orally, electroni-
cally or otherwise) should not normally be construed to be agreement to
terms in the other's record unless that record is part of the original
agreement."108
This guideline presumably protects a party who performs after receiv-
ing a written confirmation of a prior informal agreement. The perform-
ance is not an agreement to any of the terms in the confirmation that
were not part of the original agreement. This guideline is somewhat dif-
ferent from Current 2-207, under which reasonable additional terms in a
confirmation could become part of the agreement unless an objection was
made. Note that the fourth guideline indicates that performance could be
an agreement to the terms in the confirmation if trade usage, course of
dealing or course of performance so indicates.
The second guideline indicates that performance is not an agreement to
terms in a record "unless the record is part of the original agreement." 10 9
This phrase indicates that a party's terms bind the other side if the terms
are part of the original agreement. Thus, for example, if terms are part of
the original agreement by a course of dealing, or because they were
agreed to when the original agreement was made, they are binding under
R2-207.
iii. Third Revised Guideline: Performance is Agreement to Terms
If No Contract Before Performance and Performing
Party Does Not Send a Record
The third guideline in Revised Comment 2 states:
The rule [that performance is not agreement to terms] would be dif-
ferent where no agreement precedes the performance and only one
party sends a record. If, for example, a buyer sends a purchase or-
der, there is no oral or other agreement and the seller delivers in
response to the purchase order but does not send its own acknowl-
edgement or acceptance, the seller should normally be treated as
106. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (West 1989); see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
107. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 4, cmt. 3 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). See infra
note 118 and accompanying text.
108. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
109. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1.
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having agreed to the terms of the purchase order.110
This guideline gives the example of a seller who ships goods without
sending its own form. A more likely scenario has the buyer as the per-
forming party who does not send a record. Often the buyer will place an
order for goods by telephone. The seller does not accept the offer on the
telephone. Instead it proposes a counter offer by shipping the goods and
enclosing its form with the shipment. The buyer then accepts the goods
without sending its own record or otherwise objecting to the seller's
terms. Has the buyer assented to the terms in the seller's form? Courts
are divided on whether Current 2-207(3) governs this fact pattern. Some
courts apply this subsection, so that the buyer's acceptance of the goods is
not assent to the seller's terms.' Other courts decline to apply Current
2-207(3), holding the buyer's acceptance of the goods to be assent to the
seller's terms." 2
The third guideline adopts the view that the buyer's acceptance of the
goods is an agreement to the seller's terms." 3 This view disregards the
fact that forms usually are not read beyond the filled- in terms." 4 It is,
however, consistent with the common law rule that acceptance of goods
tendered with an offer constitutes an acceptance of the terms of the of-
fer." 5 It is also the view adopted in the Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc." 6 It
should be noted, however, that this view is not based on the layered con-
tract approach, on which the Revision purports to be neutral." 7
The third guideline does not follow the neutrality principle. The terms
of the party who used a record prevail. As a result, consumer buyers will
normally be bound to the seller's form clauses, subject to a showing that
the clauses are unconscionable. Other buyers who do not send purchase
orders or confirmations may find themselves similarly bound despite the
fact that they are no more likely than someone who sends a writing to
have read the other party's form. To avoid being bound under this guide-
line, a buyer should always send a record.
110. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision 1989).
111. See C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir.
1977); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168-69, n.6 (6th Cir. 1972) (ap-
plying Current 2-207 to a mutual conduct contract following an oral order and the seller's
written response); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980); USEMCO, Inc. v. Marbro Co., Inc., 483 A.2d 88, 92 (Md. Spec. App.
1984).
112. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
113. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
114. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(2) (1981).
116. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
117. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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iv. Fourth Revised Guideline: Trade Usage, Course of Dealing and
Course of Performance Can Add Terms to Contract
Revised Comments 2 and 3 address the effect of course of perform-
ance, course of dealing and trade usage on a party's agreement to
terms.118 These comments modify the guidelines discussed above. Thus,
a course of performance, course of dealing or trade usage can make a
term in one party's record part of the agreement even though the record
is not received until after an agreement has been made, and even though
both parties have used records.
Revised Comment 2 states in pertinent part:
It is impossible that trade practice in a particular trade or course of
dealing between the contracting parties might treat the offeree's per-
formance as acceptance of the offeror's terms even when the offeree
sent its own record; conversely trade practice or course of dealing
might bind the offeror to terms in the offeree's form when the expec-
tation in the trade or in the course of dealing so directs.119
Revised Comment 3 states:
An "agreement" may include terms from a course of performance, a
course of dealing or trade usage. See section 1-201. If the members
of a trade or if the contracting parties expect to be bound by a term
that appears in the record of only one contracting party, that term is
part of the agreement. However, repeated use of a particular term
or repeated failure to object to a term on another's record is not
normally sufficient in itself to establish a course of performance, a
course of dealing or trade usage.1 20
These comments make three main points. The first point is that terms
in the record of one party that correspond to a course of performance,
course of dealing or trade usage are part of the parties' agreement.
Under both Current and Revised Article 2 these usages are part of the
parties' agreement unless specifically negated during negotiations.121 The
second sentence of Revised Comment 3 explains why one party's terms
can become part of the agreement via trade usage, course of dealing or
course of performance-the parties expect to be bound by these
usages. 122
The second point made by the Revised Comments is that repeated
sending of a record or repeated failure to object to a record does not
normally establish a course of performance, course of dealing or trade
118. U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) (definition of "course of Per-
formance"). Id. § 1-3-3(b) (definition of "course of dealing"). Id. § 1-3-3(c) (definition of
"usage of trade").
119. Id. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 4. The Revised Comment uses the term "trade practice."
This phrase probably means "usage of trade," ad defined in, id. § 1-205(2).
120. Id. cmt. 3.
121. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (West 1989; U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
Cf. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2 (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov.
2000).
122. U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 3 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000); U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (West
1989). Cf. Id. § 2-202, cmt. 2.
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usage of the kind that makes the record's terms part of the agreement.12 3
This view reflects the weight of authority under Current 2-207.124 Thus,
for example, if a seller sent the same form in five previous transactions
and the buyer did not object to any of the forms, this pattern does not, by
itself, establish a course of dealing that the seller's terms prevail.12 5 If,
however, a party has engaged in particular conduct that shows agreement
to a specific term in the other party's record, this conduct establishes a
course of dealing for subsequent transactions.12 6
The third point is that trade usage or course of dealing could treat a
party's performance as agreement to the other party's terms even if the
performing party has sent its own record. According to Revised Com-
ment 2 performance is treated as agreement to the other party's terms
when this is "the expectation in the trade or in the course of dealing.' 12 7
Thus, for example, when a form contains terms generally acceptable in a
trade, such as a broker's note, it is expected that performance is accept-
ance of the terms in that form.
An issue under this third point is whether one agrees to the other
party's terms by performing if those terms are commonly found in forms
used by one side in the particular trade. For example, sellers' forms inva-
riably contain a remedy limitation clause. Does the buyer agree to that
clause under Revised Comment 2 by performing, even if the buyer has
sent its own record? Probably not. The fact that certain terms are com-
monly included in sellers' forms normally does not constitute a usage of
trade without evidence that those terms are usually accepted by buy-
ers.12 8 A change in this rule would be very significant since it would tip
123. U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 3 (Proposed 2000 Revision).
124. See, e.g., PSC Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. The Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d
974 (8th Cir. 2000); In re CFLC, Inc., 166 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 1999); Step-Saver Data Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1991); Diamond Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F. 2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1986); Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder,
Inc., 399 N.E. 2d 1154 (N.Y. 1979). See White & Summers, supra n. 29 111 at n.2. Contra
see, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F. 2d 1333, 1336-37 (7th
Cir. 1987). Some courts make the terms not objected to part of the contract only if no
unreasonable hardship results. Trans-Aire Int'l, Inc. v. Northern Adhesive Co., Inc., 882 F.
2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1989) (dictum). This latter approach is based on the "materially alters"
test of Current 2-207(2). With the removal of that test from the Revision this approach no
longer has a statutory basis.
125. Note, however, that if the buyer sent no record and no contract had been made
before its performance, the buyer normally would be deemed to have agreed to the seller's
terms by performing, regardless of the existence of a course of dealing. See U.C.C. § 2-207,
cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
126. See, e.g., Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Eng'g, Inc., 91 F. 3d 1002, 1009 (7th
Cir. 1996) (failure to claim consequential damages in prior deals indicates assent to term
excluding such damages in current deal); Advance Concrete Forms, Inc., v. McCann Const.
Specialties Co., 916 F. 2d 412, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1990) (continuing to place orders after ob-
jection to term has been rebuffed indicates assent to term), but see Diamond Fruit Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1986) (contra). For an example of
trade usage binding a party to a term in the other party's form, see Bayway Refining Co. v.
Oxygenated Marketing and Trading A.G., 215 F. 3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2000).
127. U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
128. See Cosden Oil & Chemical Co., v. Karl 0. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d
1064, 1075 (5th Cir. 1984). Cf Bayway Refining Co. v. Oxygenated Marketing & Trading
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the battle of forms in favor of the sellers. If the drafters of the Revision
had intended such a major change one would have expected the change
to be more clearly indicated.
b. Issues That Transcend the Revised Guidelines
This section discusses issues that arise under more than one of the Re-
vised Comments' guidelines. It covers: (1) the effect of an objection to
terms; (2) the effect of replacing the "materially alters" test with the
"agrees to the terms" test; and (3) the scope of the layered contract ap-
proach under the Revision.
i. Effect of An Objection to Terms
Neither the text nor the comments of R2-207 discuss the effect of an
objection to the other side's terms. Under Current 2-207(2), an objection
prevents terms from being part of the contract. Consequently, most
forms contain clauses that object to any terms not contained in the form.
What is the effect of these clauses under the Revision? Presumably, an
objection to a term indicates that the objecting party does not agree to
the term under R2-207(2). It could be argued, however, that the objec-
tion is waived by later performance or that a court.may use its discretion
to include a clause despite the objection. Revised Comment 2 does not
specifically address these arguments. It does, however, indicate that one
who performs after sending its own record normally does not agree to the
other's terms. 129 Thus, an objection likely precludes an agreement. Cur-
rent 2-207(2), however, is clearer on the effect of an objection.
ii. Substitution of "Agrees to the Terms" Test for "Materially
Alters" Test
R2-207 discards the "materially alters" test of Current 2-207(2) and the
forty-odd years of case law developed under it. That test focuses on the
content of the term. It permits unread reasonable clauses to enter the
contract by silence, while protecting against inadvertent assent by silence
to unread one-sided form clauses.130 The Revision substitutes guidelines
that focus not on the term's content, but on whether a party has sent a
record.
These Revised guidelines may make it more difficult for reasonable
additional clauses to enter the contract if the other party does not object
to them. Consider, for example, the fate of a clause charging interest on
overdue balances under Current and Revised 2-207. Assume the parties
A.G., 215 F. 3d 219, at 225 (2d Cir. 2000) (evidence that buyers always paid excise tax in
accordance with sellers' terms). But see Figgie Intern., Inc. v. Destilera Serralles, Inc., 190
F. 3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 1999) (uncontested affidavit that sellers always limit liability suffi-
cient to establish trade usage); M.A. Mortensen Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P. 2d 305, 314 (Wash. 2000) (uncontradicted evidence of "unquestioned use of such license
agreements throughout the software industry" can establish trade usage).
129. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
130. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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make a contract on the telephone. The seller then sends the goods with
an invoice containing the interest clause. The buyer takes the goods and
does not object to the clause. Under Current 2-207(2), the clause does
not materially alter the contract. 31 Thus, it becomes part of the contract.
Whether the interest clause would become part of the contract under R2-
207 is less clear. Has the buyer agreed to the clause by performance
under R2-207(2)? The second guideline indicates the buyer's perform-
ance is not an agreement to the seller's terms. 132 Perhaps the clause
would be part of the contract under trade usage, course of dealing or
course of performance. 133 Alternatively, perhaps a court could use its
discretion to add the interest clause to the contract. 134 Unlike Current 2-
207(2), the revised guidelines do not focus on the content of a term in
deciding whether performance constitutes agreement to that term. Expe-
rience suggests that a term's content is an important factor governing
whether the term will be included in the contract. If courts cannot con-
sider this factor explicitly, they will do so implicitly. This will often result
in warping of legal rules, 135 and predictability suffers. Making the issue
turn ultimately on the court's discretion, as do the revised guidelines,
does not improve predictability. On balance, the "materially alters" test
(together with the illustrative types of clauses given in Current Com-
ments 4 and 5) appears to provide a more predictable basis than the Revi-
sion for including reasonable additional form clauses in the contract when
there is performance without objection.
iii. Scope of the Layered Contract Approach
Revised Comment 4 explains the relation of R2-207 to the layered con-
tract approach. That comment states:
The section omits any specific treatment of terms on or in the
container in which the goods are delivered. Revised Article 2 takes
no position on the question whether a court should follow the rea-
soning in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Section 2-207 does not apply to such cases; the "rolling contract" is
not made until acceptance of the seller's terms after the goods and
terms are delivered) or the contrary reasoning in Step-Saver Data
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (con-
tract is made at time of oral or other bargain and 'shrink wrap' terms
or those in the container become part of the contract only if they
comply with provisions like Section 2-207).136
We have seen that R2-207 embraces the neutrality principle: neither
side's terms control. 137 Consonant with that principle, the guidelines of
131. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (West 1989).
132. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2.
133. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 4..
134. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 5 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
135. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
136. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 4.




Revised Comment 2 indicate that performance is, in most instance, not
agreement to the other party's terms.138 If, however, the layered con-
tract 139 (also known as the "rolling contract") approach applies, the
buyer agrees to the seller's terms by keeping the goods delivered to it.
Under this approach, if the buyer has reason to know that the seller will
enclose its terms with the goods, the buyer's retention of the goods is
treated as assent to the seller's terms.140 Thus, the layered contract ap-
proach and the neutrality principle are at war-they lead to diametrically
opposed results. Both of these theories existed under Current Article
2,141 and this has created a good deal of uncertainty. Hence the separate
discussion of this important issue.
Several Revised Article 2 Drafting Committees struggled to produce a
satisfactory provision describing when the layered contract approach ap-
plies.142 Their efforts foundered, resulting in Revised Comment 4, which
reflects a decision to take no position on this issue. 143
What is the dividing line between these two theories under the Revi-
sion? When does the layered contract approach apply, and when does
the neutrality principle apply? The Revised Comment 2 guidelines indi-
cate the key distinctions are: (1) when is the contract formed, and (2) did
the buyer send its own record. In sum, if the contract is formed before
the buyer receives the goods and the seller's terms, the neutrality princi-
138. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Revised Comment 2's
guidelines).
139. See, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313(Wash. 2000); UCITA § 202 cmt. 4 (2000).
140. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software
Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313; Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998). The cases base this theory on Current 2-204.
141. Under Current 2-207, if the seller's form is treated as an acceptance or confirma-
tion, the additional and different terms in the seller's form are treated as proposals for
modification. The buyer's retention of the goods is generally not treated as assent to the
seller's form clauses. See infra note 147. Current 2-207 was not unsympathetic to the
"layered contract" approach. It contained a version of this approach in Current 2-207(2).
Between merchants, terms proposed after the contract had been formed became part of
the contract if the proposed terms did not materially alter the contract and the buyer failed
to object to them. This merchant rule:
rests on normal business practices which are or ought to be typical of and
familiar to any person in business. For purposes of [this] section almost
every person in business would, therefore, be deemed to be 'a merchant'...
since the practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized business
practices such as answering mail.
U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (West 1989). But see Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (dictum); Mortenson, 998
P.2d at 312, n.9 (concluding that the respective buyers in ProCD and Mortenson were not
merchants under Current 2-207, which conflicts with this comment).
142. The original drafting committee, with Professor Richard Speidel as Reporter (the
"Speidel Drafting Committee"), functioned from 1992 until 1999. A new drafting commit-
tee, with Professor Henry Gabriel as Reporter (the "Gabriel Drafting Committee"), has
functioned since Fall 1999. See March 2000 Draft of Revision of U.C.C. Article 2 § 2-207(b)
cmts. 3-5 (Gabriel Drafting Committee); March 1, 1999 Draft of Revision of U.C.C. Article
2 § 2-207(d) cmt. 5 (Speidel Drafting Committee) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2001) (providing several unsuccessful drafts of a
provision regarding the layered contract approach).
143. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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pie governs.144 If the contract is formed after the buyer receives the
goods and the seller's terms, the layered contract approach applies, 145 un-
less the buyer sends its own record.146
The guidelines generally follow existing law. First, the guidelines indi-
cate that performance after a contract has been made is not normally an
agreement to the other party's terms received after the contract has been
made. 147 This guideline is consistent with Current 2-207148 and the case
law developed under that provision. 149 When a contract has been formed
before the seller sends its terms, those terms are treated as proposals to
modify the contract. 150 There is good reason to be reluctant to find that
the buyer has agreed to the proposed modification merely by performing.
The buyer's conduct in keeping the goods more likely indicates perform-
ance under the original contract, rather than an agreement to the (usu-
ally) one-sided form clauses contained in the seller's proposed
modification. The layered contract cases do not directly disagree with
this result; rather, they find that no contract had been formed until the
buyer performed. 151
Next the guidelines indicate that if no contract has been formed before
the buyer performs its performance normally constitutes an agreement to
the seller's terms if the buyer did not send a record. 152 This result is con-
sistent with the layered contract approach. 153 In this case, that result
merely reflects the common law rule of offer and acceptance: the seller
makes an offer by tendering the goods with its terms. When the buyer
144. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the second guideline).
145. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000); see also supra
note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the third guideline).
146. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000); see also supra
note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the first guideline).
147. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
148. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmts. 1, 6 (West 1989).
149. See, e.g., Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v. McCann Constr. Specialties Co., 916
F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1990); Trans-Aire Int'l, Inc. v. N. Adhesive Co., 882 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir.
1989); Supak and Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979). Cf.
Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Cur-
rent 2-207 whether contract formed orally or by acknowledgment acting as acceptance);
Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 764-65 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that
an invoice qualifies as acceptance or written confirmation; court applies Current 2-207);
Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375, 378, n.4 (5th Cir. 1981)
(declining to rule on when contract formed because, in any case, Current 2-207 applies);
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that seller's
acknowledgment could be acceptance or confirmation and applying Current 2-207 in both
cases); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(holding that seller accepted by agreeing to ship or shipping goods and applying Current 2-
207).
150. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-207(iii) cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). This point was
clearer under Current 2-207(2).
151. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1996); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
152. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
153. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
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accepts the goods, it accepts the terms of the offer. 154
However, if the buyer has sent a record, its performance is not an
agreement to the seller's terms.155 This guideline thus protects the buyer
in the battle of the forms. It is consistent with Current 2-207,156 and with
most of the layered contract case law.157
So far, so good. Unfortunately, layered contract case law undercuts
both of the distinction made by the Revised Comment 2 guidelines. As
for the first distinction-the timing of contract formation-the layered
contract cases typically employ an unorthodox application of contract for-
mation rules to delay the formation of a contract until after the buyer has
received the goods and the seller's terms. In determining when a contract
has been formed, courts should apply the general contract law of offer
and acceptance, except as modified by Article 2.158 The layered contract
cases often contain facts that could easily indicate the existence of an
initial contract before the goods were shipped, yet these cases usually fail
to discuss whether the parties' words or deeds formed a contract before
the buyer received the goods. Two layered contract cases that illustrate
this reasoning are M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software
Corp.159 and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.160
First, consider the Washington Supreme Court's application of the
layered contract approach in MA Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline
Software Corp.161 In that case, the buyer's purchase order for software
was signed by the seller's agent. Later the software arrived with the
seller's shrink wrap license. The buyer proceeded to use the software and
suffered a $2 million loss caused by a bug in the software. The buyer
sued, and the seller defended by asserting a clause in its license that lim-
ited its liability. The buyer argued that the signed purchase order had
created a contract and the seller's license proposed additional terms that
154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(2) (1981). Current 2-207
case law, however, is divided on this point. For cases applying Current 2-207 see C. Itoh &
Co. (America), Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1977); Dorton v.
Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168-69, n.6 (6th Cir. 1972) (applying Current 2-
207 to mutual conduct contract following an oral order and the seller's written response);
Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
USEMCO, Inc. v. Marbro Co., Inc., 483 A.2d 88, 92 (Md. Spec. App. 1984). For cases
declining to apply Current 2-207, see supra note 151.
155. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
156. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (West 1989) (providing that retention of the goods is not assent
to the seller's terms). See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 101, n.34
(3d Cir. 1991).
157. The layered contract cases do, save one, not purport to apply to the battle of the
forms. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (distinguishing Step-Saver on the grounds that it was a
battle of the forms case); but see M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp.,
998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (applying the layered contract approach so the seller's
terms prevail, even though the seller signed the buyer's purchase order).
158. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (West 1989).
159. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
160. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). This case is cited in Revised Comment 3.
161. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
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did not become part of the contract under Current 2-207.162 The seller
conceded that the signed purchase order was an agreement. 163 Neverthe-
less, the court declined to apply Current 2-207.164 Rather, the court
found a layered contract under Current 2-204 and held that the buyer's
use of the software constituted consent to the license terms. 165 The court
apparently concluded that a contract was not formed until the buyer used
the software. 166 The court's opinion fails to explain why the signed
purchase order was not a contract for the purpose of applying Current 2-
207.167
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.168 is simi-
larly incomplete. In that case, the buyer ordered a computer system via a
telephone call to the seller's sales representative. The seller proceeded to
fax a confirmation to the buyer. The seller then charged the buyer's
credit card and shipped the computer. The computer box contained nu-
merous documents, including a four page form, which recited that the
buyer accepted the terms in the form if it kept the computer for more
than the 30 days.169 The form also contained an arbitration clause. The
buyer did not return the computer. Later it commenced a class action
suit, and the seller moved to compel arbitration. The district court de-
clined to compel arbitration, concluding that insufficient evidence had
been adduced to find an agreement to arbitrate. 170
The Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered arbitration. Applying its
earlier decision in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,171 the Seventh Circuit con-
strued the seller's shipment of the computer with the enclosed terms to
be an offer to either accept the terms or return the computer. The court
held that the buyer accepted this offer by keeping the computer beyond
the 30 day period. 172 Thus, the court held that the buyer accepted the
seller's terms, including the arbitration clause.173 The court concluded
162. The buyer argued that the license terms were proposals for addition to the contract
under Current 2-207(2), which did not become part of the contract because they materially
altered it. See Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 311-12.
163. See M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 808
(Wash Ct. App. 1999).
164. See M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312
(Wash. 2000).
165. See id. at 313.
166. The court indicated it chose to apply Current 2-204 rather than Current 2-207 be-
cause "this is a case about contract formation, not contract alteration." Id. at 312.
167. The court concluded that the purchase order was not a fully integrated contract for
parol evidence purposes. See id. at 311. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the signed
purchase order constituting an agreement under Current 2-207.
168. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
169. The document also contained a clause giving the buyer the right to return the
computer within 30 days of delivery and receive a refund of the purchase price, less the
shipping costs to and from the buyer. The total shipping costs to and from the buyer would
have been at least $200. This estimate of cost is based on the author's purchase of a Gate-
way computer approximately six months before Hills' purchase.
170. See id. at 1147.
171. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).




that Current 2-207 was inapplicable because only one form had been
used. 174
The Seventh Circuit's opinion fails to discuss why a contract was not
formed during the telephone call.175 Moreover, there is no discussion of
why the seller's conduct in shipping the computer was not an accept-
ance. 176 This latter omission is particularly puzzling, because, not only
did the buyer argue this theory in its brief,177 but the seller's own docu-
ments seem to have treated the seller as accepting the buyer's offer. 178
The curious fashion in which these cases treat the timing of contract
formation makes it difficult to predict when a court will apply the layered
contract approach and when it will apply the neutrality principle of R-2-
207.
174. Id. (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452). The ProCD court was referring to the fact that
only one side (the seller) had used a form. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. The statements in
Hill and ProCD that Current 2-207 does not apply to one form cases do not necessarily
conflict with the indication in Comment 1 to Current 2-207 that this section applies to cases
in which only one party sends a form that confirms a prior agreement. In neither Hill nor
ProCD did the court find the form to have been a confirmation of a prior agreement;
rather these cases found the form to be an offer to make an agreement. Thus, when it
made its statement about the inapplicability of Current 2-207, the Seventh Circuit was not
necessarily concerned with one form confirmation situations. Further, limiting the state-
ments in Hill and ProCD to the findings in those cases avoids reading these cases so that
they conflict with other cases, including several previous Seventh Circuit opinions. See
supra note 149 (citing opinions that apply Current 2-207 to one form confirmation
situations).
175. It is possible that the buyer and seller could have made a contract on the tele-
phone. Ultimately, it depends on what was said during the telephone call.
176. Case law indicates that shipment can constitute acceptance. See, e.g., Townsend
Props., Inc. v. Z.N., Inc., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 1099 (D. Md. 1994) (finding a shipment to
constitute acceptance of offer); Arizona Retail Sys, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp.
759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that a seller accepted by agreeing to ship or by shipping
goods); Klocek v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding
that a seller accepted by agreeing to ship or by shipping goods). Cf. U.C.C. § 2-206(a)(2)
(Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) (holding that an offer for a current shipment may be ac-
cepted by the shipment of goods).
177. See Appellee's Brief at 13-14, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
1997) (No. 96-3294).
178. It appears from the seller's documents that the seller treated the buyer as having
made an offer, and the seller intended to accept that offer by shipping the goods. For
example, the seller's standard invoice form, which is sent with the goods, states that the
goods have been "sold to" the buyer. (Copy of Gateway standard invoice on file with
author.) Paragraph 5 of the seller's Standard Terms and Conditions indicates that the ship-
ment date is determined by the later of the seller's "acceptance of buyer's offer," or
buyer's compliance with payment arrangements. Appellee's Brief, n.177, at A-15. Under
Paragraph 6, title to the goods passes to the buyer on delivery. Id. at A-15. The fact that
the seller's documents lack language of acceptance would not prevent them from being an
acceptance. Courts often find forms lacking such language to be definite expressions of
acceptance. See supra note 36. Further, nothing in the seller's Standard Terms and Condi-
tions indicates that the seller's acceptance is expressly conditioned on the buyer's assent to
the terms in that form. Thus, it appears the seller's documents constituted an uncondi-
tional, definite expression of acceptance that formed a contract under Current 2-207(1).
Under this view, the additional terms in the seller's documents would have been proposals
for addition to the contract under Current 2-207(2). Since the buyer was a consumer, the
special merchants rule of that subsection would not have applied. Consequently, express




As for the second distinction made by the Revised Comment guide-
lines-whether the buyer has sent a record-most of the layered contract
cases do not undercut this distinction. They concede that the layered con-
tract approach does not apply to a battle of forms.' 79 The Mortenson
case, 180 however, extends the layered contract approach to a battle of
forms, resulting in the seller winning the battle. This case thus raises the
issue whether a seller can win the battle of forms by the simple expedient
of enclosing its terms with the goods.
Revised Comment 4 states that R2-207 omits specific treatment of
terms enclose with the goods. Does this lacuna mean that courts are free
to apply the layered contract approach to a battle of forms? Probably
not. The Revised Comments contain several indications that R2-207 is
intended to cover the battle of forms.181 Indeed the weight of the layered
contract case law, which is reflected in the Hill case 182 cited in Comment
4, is that Current 2-207, not the layered contract approach, governs the
battle of forms. To interpret Revised Comment 4 as meaning that R2-207
does not govern a battle of forms when the seller encloses its terms with
the goods would work a major change in the law. It would mean, as a
practical matter, that most battle of forms would be governed, not by R2-
207, which was designed to provide standards for ascertaining the terms
of sales contracts, but by law for which Revised Article 2 provides no
specific coverage. If the drafters had intended to omit most battle of
forms cases from R2-207 they would likely have stated this intent more
clearly.
On balance, it seems that R2-207 is intended to govern the battle of
forms. The layered contract approach (should a court choose to adopt it)
could apply to a transaction in which the buy does not send a form, the
seller encloses its terms with the goods, and a contract has not been
formed until the buyer accepts the goods.
3. R2-207(3): Terms Supplied by the U.C.C.
R2-207(3) includes in the contract "terms supplied or incorporated
under any provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code]."'1 83 This sub-
section is derived from Current 2-207(3) and Comment 6 without sub-
stantial change. It states the well-recognized principle of Current and
Revised Article 2 that a court may fill gaps in the parties' express agree-
ment with terms contained in Article 2.184 These supplementary terms
include terms established by course of dealing and usage of trade185 as
179. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
180. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Softward Corp., 998 P. 2d 305 (Wash 2000).
181. Revised Comment 1 so indicates. Also the first guideline in Revised Comment 2
describes what is essentially a battle of forms and indicates that R2-207 governs. See
U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 2, para. 1.
182. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F. 3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
183. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
184. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 19.
185. See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1451 (7th Cir. 1992).
See U.C.C. § 1-205 (West 1989); U.C.C. §§ 1-303(a), (c) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000)
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well as the Article 2 standard "gap-filler" terms.186 These standard gap-
filler terms sometimes favor the buyer. For example, the gap-fillers give
the buyer a merchantability warranty and the right to recover conse-
quential damages. 187
D. COMPARISON OF CONTRACT TERMS UNDER CURRENT AND
REVISED 2-207
This segment compares contract terms under the Revision and Current
2-207 when a contract is formed under each of the three methods of con-
tract formation described in Current 2-207 and Revised 2-207(i)-(iii): (1)
mutual conduct; (2) unconditional definite expression of acceptance; and
(3) written confirmation of prior informal agreement. 188
1. R2-207(i) [Contract Formed by Mutual Conduct]
The Revision basically follows Current 2-207(3) on contracts formed by
mutual conduct. The Revision, however, may result in a contract with
terms different than those under Current 2-207(3). The difference stems
from the fact that R2-207(2) substitutes an "agrees to the terms" test for
Current 2-207(2). The Revision also indicates that the neutrality princi-
ple does not apply when no contract has been formed before perform-
ance and a performing party has not used a record.
R2-207(i) states that R2-207 governs contracts formed when "conduct
by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract although their
records do not otherwise establish a contract. 1 89 This language is drawn
from Current 2-207(3) without substantial change. Both R2-207 and Cur-
rent 2-207(3) apply when the parties' records do not evidence a contract,
but the parties, nevertheless, act as if they have made a contract. For
example, when the seller ships and the buyer accepts the goods. 190 These
provisions are designed to resolve the battle of the forms.19' Both provi-
sions enshrine the neutrality principle: neither party's form controls.1
92
Under Current 2-207 and R2-207, the terms of a contract formed by
mutual conduct include: (1) terms that appear in the records of both par-
(providing definitions of "course of performance" and "usage of trade"). Terms estab-
lished by course of dealing and usage of trade are part of the parties' "agreement." See
U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (West 1989); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
186. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 116 (concerning the "gap-
filler" concept).
187. U.C.C. §§ 2-314(a); 2-715(b) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
188. See supra text accompanying note 56.
189. U.C.C. § 2-207(i) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
190. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (West 1989); cf. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7 (West
1989) ("In many cases, as where goods shipped, accepted and paid for before any dispute
arises, there is no question whether a contract has been made .... The only question is
what terms are included in the contract, and subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule.").
191. See Wladis, supra note 28, at 1047.




ties; 193 and (2) terms incorporated by the U.C.C. 94 R2-207(2) adds a
reference to terms to which both parties agree that does not appear in the
statement of contract terms in Current 2-207(3). This is not a change
from Current 2-207(3) when there is express assent to a term;195 nor is it a
change when assent has been manifested by conduct indicating that a par-
ticular term is part of the contract. 196 As for assent to terms by silence or
mere performance, the added reference may work a change from Current
2-207(3). By substituting the "agrees to terms" test of R2-207(2) for Cur-
rent 2-207(2), the Revision may make it more difficult for reasonable
terms to enter the contract by silence. 197 This point is discussed in detail
elsewhere in this article.' 98
The Revision clarifies a point on which case law was divided under
Current 2-207. When a contract has not yet been formed, a buyer who
accepts goods with the seller's terms accepts those terms if it does not
send its own record to the seller.199
2. R2-207(ii) [Contract Formed by Offer and Acceptance]
R2-207(ii) includes the definite expression of acceptance method of
contract formation in Current 2-207(1).200 R2-207 clarifies the terms of a
contract formed by a definite expression of acceptance containing terms
that do not match the offer.201 It also adopts the neutrality principle. As
a result, the offeror is not the master of its offer under the Revision, un-
less the offer specifically says so.
R2-207(ii) states that R2-207 applies when "a contract is formed by an
193. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) with U.C.C. § 2-207
cmt. 6 (West 1989).
194. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) with U.C.C. § 2-207
cmt. 6 (West 1989).
195. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(2) cmt. 2, para. 3 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) with
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (West 1989).
196. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) with Wau-
kesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
failure to claim consequential damages in prior deals indicates assent to term excluding
such damages in current deal); Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329,
1334-35 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that action taken consistent with a term indicates assent to
the term); Constr. Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir.
1968) (objecting to only some form clauses indicates assent to others); Advance Concrete
Forms, Inc. v. McCann Constr. Specialties Co., 916 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1990) (continu-
ing to place orders after objection to term has been rebuffed indicates assent to term). But
see Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that continuing to order goods after objection to term has been rebuffed does not
make term part of contract).
197. Some cases hold that Current 2-207(2) is a source of supplemental terms under
Current 2-207(3). See, e.g., Join, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 151 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1998).
This was also the intent of the drafters of Current 2-207. See Wladis, supra note 28, at
1048.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
199. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). See also supra
text accompanying note 110 (discussing this point in detail).
200. U.C.C. § 2-207(ii) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
201. Id. § 2-207()-(3).
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offer and acceptance. ' 20 2 This language is derived from the "definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance" language in Current 2-207(1).203
The Revision is phrased more broadly than Current 2-207(1), because
R2-207 covers all contracts formed by offer and acceptance, not just con-
tracts formed by an acceptance with terms varying from those in the of-
fer. There is no doubt, however, that R2-207 covers contracts formed by
offers and unconditional definite expressions of acceptance under R2-
206(c).
Current 2-207 is silent on the terms of a contract formed by a definite
expression of acceptance. 20 4 This silence has resulted in divided case law
on what terms are included in such contracts. Most courts have applied
the knock out rule: the conflicting terms in the offer and the acceptance
cancel each other out so neither conflicting term enters the contract;
other courts have held that the terms in the offer control.20 5 The Revi-
sion resolves this split by adopting the knock out rule and its neutrality
principle: neither the terms of the offer, nor the terms of the acceptance
control. The contract is formed on the jointly agreed upon terms, plus
those terms incorporated by the U.C.C.20 6 The justification for applying
the neutrality principle is to avoid any strategic advantage to sending the
first or last record.207
R2-207 also changes the treatment of additional terms-terms appear-
ing in only one of the forms. Additional terms that appear in the offer or
the acceptance are not part of the contract under the Revision, unless the
other party agrees to them.208 Cases under Current 2-207 automatically
include any of the offer's additional terms in the contract. 20 9 Further,
Current 2-207(2) permits additional terms in the acceptance to become
202. Id. § 2-207(ii).
203. The definite expression of the acceptance contract formation rule of Current 2-
207(1) has been moved to R2-206(c). See supra text accompanying note 27.
204. The drafters of Current 2-207 probably intended the terms of the offer to control.
The fact that Current 2-207 does not state the terms of a contract formed by a definite
expression of acceptance indicates that the drafters intended the normal contract rule to
apply: an offeree who accepts an offer is bound by the terms of the offer. Support for this
interpretation can be found in two early articles discussing Current 2-207. That section had
been criticized on the ground that, under Current 2-207, the offeror was no longer master
of its offer. In defense of Current 2-207, the author of each article asserted that a definite
expression of acceptance formed a contract on the terms of the offer. See William D.
Hawkland, In Re Articles 1, 2, and 6, 28 TEMPLE L. Q. 512, 521 (1955); William B. Daven-
port, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and
Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAw. 75, 79-80 (1963). Both
authors later became members of the Article 2 subcommittee that devised the 1966 amend-
ments to the Current 2-207 comments.
205. See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing divided case law).
206. Under R2-207, "the terms of the contract ... are: (1) terms that appear in the
records of both parties; (2) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties agree;
and (3) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of [the U.C.C.]" See U.C.C.
S§ 2-207(1)-(3) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
207. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 1.
208. See id. § 2-207(2).
209. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197, 1199-2000
(6th Cir. 1981); Idaho Power v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1979).
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part of the contract by silence. This provision has been replaced with the
"agrees to the terms" test of R2-207(2). This substitution makes it more
difficult for reasonable terms to become part of the contract when the
other side does not object to those terms.210
Note that under the Revision, the offeror is not the master of its offer
unless it says so. If the response to an offer is an unconditional, definite
expression of acceptance, a contract is formed under R2-206(c). Under
R2-207, the terms in the acceptance knock out conflicting terms in the
offer.211 As a practical matter, the offeror's risk here is confined to con-
flicting form clauses, because a response containing clauses that conflict
with non-form clauses in the offer would likely not be a definite expres-
sion of acceptance.2 12
The offeror can avoid this risk by including in the offer a clause stating
that assent to all of the terms in the offer is required before a contract is
formed.2 13 This clause will prevent the formation of a contract by a re-
sponse that does not match the offer. Note, however, that if the parties
proceed to perform after exchanging non-matching records, this clause
will not prevent a contract from being formed by mutual conduct.214
3. R2-207(iii) [Written Confirmation of Prior Informal Agreement]
R2-207(iii) basically follows Current 2-207(1) on written confirmations.
However, the substitution of the "agrees to the terms" test for Current 2-
207(2) may mean that the resulting terms of a confirmed contract under
the Revision are different than under Current 2-207.
R2-207(iii) indicates that R2-207 governs when "a contract formed in
any manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional to or
different from those in the contract being confirmed. ' 215 The written
confirmation method of contract formation under both Current 2-207 and
R2-207 presumes the parties have made an informal agreement, such as
by telephone, which one or both parties then confirm in writing.216
Neither Current 2-207 nor R2-207 state rules for determining when the
parties have made an informal agreement prior to the confirmation.
Those rules are found in Current 2-204 and 2-206, as supplemented by the
common law contract rules of offer and acceptance. 217
R2-207(iii) makes several changes and clarifications to Current 2-
207(1) in describing the written confirmation situation, none of which ap-
pear to be significant. First, by omitting a reference to expressly condi-
tional language, R2-207(iii) clarifies that such language in a confirmation
210. See supra text accompanying note 131-35.
211. See supra text accompanying note 205.
212. See supra text accompanying note 38.
213. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
214. See id.
215. Id. § 2-207(iii).
216. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (West 1989). Often the confirmation is sent to ensure that
the agreement satisfies the statute of frauds.
217. Id. § 1-103; see also U.C.C. §§ 2-204-206 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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is ineffective-it does not undo the earlier informal agreement. This re-
sult is consistent with the case law under Current 2-207.218 Second, the
text of R2-207(iii) omits the requirement of Current 2-207(1) that the
confirmation be "sent within a reasonable time. ''2 19 The Revision gives
no reason for this omission.
Under Current 2-207 and R2-207, the terms of an informal contract
confirmed in writing include: (1) terms that appear in the confirmations
of both parties;220 and (2) terms incorporated under the U.C.C.221 The
only significant difference between Current 2-207 and R2-207 on the
terms of a confirmed contract is that R2-207(2) substitutes an "agrees to
the terms" test for Current 2-207(2). This substitution makes it more dif-
ficult for reasonable terms to become part of the contract when the other
side does not object to those terms.
Revised Comment 1 draws a distinction between confirmations under
R2-207 and modifications under R2-209.22 2 This comment is potentially
misleading. It is true that courts sometimes distinguish between "propos-
als for addition" under Current 2-207 and "proposals for modification"
under Current 2-209.223 Under the Revision, a confirmation containing
terms additional to the original agreement is still a proposal to modify the
original agreement, to which the other party may or may not agree. If the
proposal is agreed to, the additional terms become part of the contract
under R2-207(2). R2-209 does not conflict with any of this; the two sec-
tions work in tandem. R2-209 presumes an agreed modification and reg-
ulates legal impediments to the enforcement of the agreed
modification.2 24 Thus, there is no inherent conflict between these sec-
tions and no need to distinguish between confirmations under R2-207 and
modifications under R2-209.
Even under Current Article 2, there is no inherent conflict and no need
to distinguish Current 2-207 confirmations from Current 2-209 modifica-
tions. The "proposals for addition to the contract" referred to in Current
2-207(2) are proposals for modification.2 25 This subsection permits assent
218. See, e.g., Am. Parts Co., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 154 N.W.2d 5,13 n.7 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1967); St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). The drafters' intent was that the expressly conditional clause in Current
2-207(1) not apply to written confirmations. See Wladis, supra note 28, at 1038-39.
219. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (West 1989) with § 2-207(iii) (Proposed Revision Nov.
2000).).
220. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (West 1989), with U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (Proposed
Revision Nov. 2000).
221. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (West 1989) with U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (Proposed Re-
vision Nov. 2000).
222. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) ("As with original Section 2-
207, courts will have to distinguish between 'confirmations' that are addressed in Section 2-
207 and 'modifications' that are addressed in Section 2-209.").
223. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991).
224. See infra text accompanying note 243 (discussing R2-209)
225. The drafters of Current Article 2 repeatedly described a "proposal for addition"
under Current 2-207(2) as a "proposal for modification." Minutes of Massachusetts Legis-
lative Subcommittee Meeting, 65-66 (1952), microformed on the KARL N. LLEWELLYN PA-
PERS, file J-XIV(1)(j) (Wm. Hein & Co. 1987) (describing Current 2-207, Llewellyn says
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by silence to modification proposals. Such assent does not, however, con-
flict with Current 2-209, since nothing in this section addresses how assent
to a modification must be manifested. A proposed modification assented
to by silence under Current 2-207(2) is not immune from the formal re-
quirements imposed by Current 2-209. In truth, however, a modification
assented to by silence under Current 2-207(2) will rarely be barred by
these formal requirements. 226 Thus, there is almost never any need to
distinguish confirmations from modifications under Current Article 2.
E. ADVICE FOR NAVIGATING THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
UNDER R2-207
1. Get A Signed Agreement
The best way to ensure that you get the terms you want is to have the
other party sign an agreement containing those terms. For routine, every-
day deals this is probably not feasible. You should consider negotiating
umbrella agreements with your repeat customers. If you accept orders
through a web site, consider structuring the site so that someone placing
an order sees a screen containing your standard terms and must click on
an "I Accept" button at the bottom of this screen to place an order.
2. What to Do When It's Not Feasible to Get A Signed Agreement
It is often not feasible to get a signed agreement. In that case, you
should understand that the battle of the forms cannot be won by simply
sending your own form or sending the last form if both parties play the
battle of the forms game properly. Revised 2-207, like Current 2-207,
adopts a neutrality principal-the battle of the forms is resolved on terms
jointly agreed plus the Code gap fillers.227
If you are the buyer, this result is not necessarily undesirable. Some of
the gap fillers favor the buyer. For example, the buyer gets a warranty of
merchantability and full damage remedies, including consequential dam-
ages, under the Code gap fillers.22 8
It is also possible that a court could apply the layered contract ap-
proach, resulting in the buyer being held to have accepted the seller's
terms by keeping the goods.229
"additional clauses are to be dealt with as proposals for modification"). See Robert
Braucher, Sale of Goods in the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REV. 192, 199 (1966).
226. The formal requirements of Current 2-209 will rarely cause problems when a mod-
ification has been assented to by silence under Current 2-207(2). NOM clauses must be in
a signed agreement to be enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (West 1989). Signed agree-
ments, however, seldom exist in transactions governed by Current 2-207. The statute of
frauds will usually be satisfied under Current 2-201(2) by the confirmation plus silence that
constitutes assent to terms under Current 2-207(2).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 253-55.
228. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314; 2-711; 2-715(b)(2) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
229. See supra text accompanying note 139. One court has applied the layered contract
approach to a battle of forms when both buyer and seller signed a purchase order. See
Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 312.
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Absent a signed agreement, to win the battle of the forms you must
argue that the other party agreed to your terms under R2-207(2). 230
With these general considerations in mind, the following specific advice
is offered for use when it is not feasible to get a signed agreement.
a. Use A Form
You should always use a form in the contracting process. A party who
does not use a form runs several risks. First, a court might conclude that
the party who did not use a form agreed to the other side's terms under
R2-207(2). 231 Second, a buyer who does not use a form or other record
increases the risk that the layered contract approach could be followed,
resulting in the buyer being bound to the seller's terms, if the buyer keeps
the goods.232
b. Include Conditional Assent Language in the Form
Any form should include language stating that the form sender does
not assent to a contract unless the other side agrees to the terms in the
form. This language is necessary for two reasons. First, if the form is
construed to be an offer and does not contain this conditional assent lan-
guage, the Revision permits the offeree to accept the offer on terms other
than those contained in the offer.233 By including conditional assent lan-
guage in the offer, a response that does not match the offer is not an
acceptance. 234
Second, under Current 2-207, courts often have construed a form
drafted as an offer to be a definite expression of acceptance with the con-
sequence that a contract was formed by an exchange of forms.2 35 Thus,
the offeror could lose control of the contracting process. Nothing in the
Revision purports to change this. If, however, the form includes condi-
tional assent language, it could not be construed as an acceptance closing
a contract.
What conditional assent language should be used? Conditional assent
language has been very narrowly construed under Current 2-207(1).236
Courts could continue this approach under the Revision. Thus, the lan-
guage should very clearly state that the form sender does not assent to a
contract unless the recipient agrees to all of the terms in the form.
230. See supra text accompanying note 79.
231. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
232. Most of the layered contract approach cases concede that Current 2-207 applies to
the battle of the forms. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (distinguishing Step-Saver Data
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), on the grounds that it was a
battle of the forms case); but see M.A. Mortenson Co. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d
305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (applying the layered contract approach so the seller's terms prevail
in a battle of forms, even though the seller signed the buyer's purchase order).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 206-12.
234. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 5 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
235. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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Though not required, the language should be on the front of the form and
be conspicuous to give the language added weight.
Note that while conditional assent language is useful in preventing the
initial formation of a contract by the exchange of non-matching forms, it
does not prevent the parties' later conduct from forming a contract.
Thus, even if the forms contain the recommended conditional assent lan-
guage, were the seller to ship and the buyer to accept the goods, a con-
tract would be formed by the parties' mutual conduct under R2-204(a).
c. Include Language Objecting to Any Terms Not Contained in the
Form
Language in a form that objects to any terms not contained in it mini-
mizes the possibility of a court finding that the form sender agreed to the
other party's terms under R2-207(2) or as a course of dealing. Such lan-
guage might also be a factor in a court's decision not to follow the layered
contract approach. To add weight, this language should be on the front of
the form and be conspicuous.
Note that, under the Revision, conditional assent language, as opposed
to language objecting to terms not in the form, might not be sufficient to
constitute an objection to terms if a contract is subsequently formed.
Comment 1 to R2-207 indicates that such language only affects contract
formation, but has no effect on the operation of R2-207 once a contract
has been formed.
VII. REVISED 2-208. COURSE OF PERFORMANCE OR
PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature,
proceed from custom.
-Montaigne
R2-208 is Current 2-208 without any change. This section describes
"course of performance" and its relation to "course of dealing" 237 and
"usage of trade. '238 These three usages are valuable sources for estab-
lishing the content of the contract under both Current and Revised Arti-
cle 2. They can be used to add terms to a contract 239 and give meaning to
a contract term.240 Course of performance can also show a waiver or
modification of any term in the contract that is inconsistent with the
237. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (West 1989) (providing a definition).
238. See id. § 1-205(2) (providing a definition).
239. See id. §§ 1-205(3), 2-202(a) cmt. 2; see also U.C.C. § 2-202(a)(1) (Proposed Revi-
sion Nov. 2000). R2-207, Comment 3 indicates that repeated use of a term or repeated
failure to object to a term normally is not itself sufficient to establish a course of perform-
ance, course of dealing or trade usage. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
240. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(3), 2-202(a) cmt. 2; 2-208(1) (West 1989); see also U.C.C. §§ 2-
202(a)(1); 2-208(a) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). See, e.g., White & Summers, supra
note 29, at 111-16 (discussing these concepts further).
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course of performance. 241
The proposed revision to Article 1 would move this section to Ri-
303(a) with minor changes of phrasing. 242
VIII. REVISED 2-209. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION,
AND WAIVER
Nothing is permanent except change.
-Heraclitus
The Revision makes no substantive changes to Current 2-209. This sec-
tion contains rules that remove technical legal impediments to the en-
forcement of commercially reasonable contract modifications while
protecting against false claims of modification. 243 Current 2-209 has been
criticized as being unclear.244 Though the Revision makes no substantive
changes in the text, the Revised Comments provide guidance on several
of the significant issues in the case law. The discussions below use the
drafting history of the Current subsections as an aid to understanding
each subsection.
A. R2-209(A) [GOOD FAITH, NOT CONSIDERATION, IS REQUIRED FOR
LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE MODIFICATIONS]
R2-209(a) is Current 2-209(1) without substantive change. It states the
doctrine that an agreement modifying a contract needs no consideration
to be binding.245 This doctrine was devised to avoid the common law pre-
existing duty rule.246 Under this rule, a modification that benefited only
one party was often held to be unenforceable for lack of consideration. 247
Sometimes, however, the modification was held to be enforceable on a
variety of theories not always consistent with the pre-existing duty
rule.248 The result was a muddle. This subsection eliminates that muddle
by removing the consideration requirement for modifications.
Modifications, however, must be made in good faith to be enforcea-
ble.249 This requirement is intended to make commercially reasonable
241. See U.C.C. § 2-208(3) (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-208(c) (Proposed Revision Nov.
2000).
242. U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
243. See id. § 2-209 cmts. 1, 3.
244. See, e.g., Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning Up U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. REV.
487 (1990).
245. See U.C.C. § 2-209(a) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
246. See Informal Appendix to REVISED UNIFORM SALES AcT, Third Draft 1943, Ten-
tative sketch of Material for Comments, Section 25 at 12, microformed on KARL N. LLEW-
ELLYN PAPERS, file J-V(2)(d) (Wm. Hein & Co. 1987) [hereinafter Informal Appendix]
(providing a tentative sketch of material for comments) ("Subsection 1 [Current 2-209(1)]
modifies the existing law on pre-existing duties defeating consideration, in the interest of
recognizing the informal modifications so frequently made, especially under installment
contracts.").
247. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 20, at 276-78.
248. See id. at 278-80.




modifications enforceable while denying enforcement of extorted modifi-
cations.250 Revised Comment 2 largely replicates Current Comment 2 on
this issue. The Revised Comment specifically approves of the reasoning
in Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corporation,2 51 which examines
when modifications have been made in good or bad faith. The revised
comment also specifically negates the argument that a modification is not
subject to the good faith requirement because it is not "performance or
enforcement" of the contract. 252
B. R2-209(B) [EFFECTIVENESS OF "No ORAL MODIFICATION" (NOM)
CONTRACT CLAUSES]
R2-209(b) is Current 2-209(3) made more friendly to electronic com-
merce by substituting the concept of "authenticated record" for "signed
writing. '253 There are no changes of substance. R2-209(b) states that "an
authenticated record which excludes modification or rescission except by
an authenticated record [a "No Oral Modification" or "NOM" clause]
cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded. '254 This provision provides
"protection against false allegations of informal modifications. '255 NOM
clauses are needed to minimize such false allegations because the parol
evidence rule does not apply to proof of an alleged oral modification of a
written contract, 256 and the statute of frauds may not require all of the
modified terms to be in writing.257
At common law, NOM clauses were essentially worthless.258 Courts
often rendered these clauses ineffective by holding that the mere making
of an informal modification deleted the NOM clause from the original
contract, thus permitting oral proof of the terms of the alleged informal
modification.259 This subsection negates those holdings.260 The potential
for injustice inherent in the enforcement of these NOM clauses is mini-
mized by R2-209(d) and (e) on waiver, and limitations on retraction of
waiver.261
250. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) (providing a
discourse on good faith and bad faith modifications); see also FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS,
supra note 20, at 283-83; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 57-60.
251. 705 F.2d 134, 145-46 (6th Cir. 1983).
252. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
253. Id. § 2-209(b).
254. Id.
255. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 3.
256. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 20, at 438, n.50; note 449, n.1; see
also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 91-92.
257. See infra text accompanying note 268.
258. Cf. Transcript of Discussion on the U.C.C.; Joint Meeting of the AL.I. and the
N.C.C.U.S.L., 304 (1950) microformed on KARL N. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, file J-XII(1)(i)(Win. Hein & Co. 1987) (discussing pre-Code law, Llewelyn says NOM clause "is a nuga-
tory clause in most states"); see also 1 Samuel Williston, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF
GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT 139, n.2 (rev. ed. 1948).
259. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 20, at 449-50.
260. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (West 1989) (disapproving explicitly of the decision in
Green v. Doniger, 90 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1949)).
261. U.C.C. § 2-209(d), (e) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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The subsection also requires separate authentication of a NOM clause
by a non-merchant, if the clause is contained in a form supplied by a
merchant. Thus, a consumer is not bound by a NOM clause in a
merchant seller's form, so informal modifications that do not implicate
the statute of frauds are enforceable, unless the consumer separately au-
thenticates the NOM clause.
C. R2-209(c) [INFORMAL MODIFICATIONS AND THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS]
R2-209(c) is Current 2-209(3) with non-substantive changes. The pur-
pose of this subsection is to protect against false allegations of modifica-
tions. 262 How the statute of frauds applies to modifications under
Current 2-209(3) is unclear.263 The Revision does not attempt to clarify
this issue. The portion of Comment 3 to R2-209 that discusses this sub-
section simply repeats the substance of Comment 3 to Current 2-209 on
this topic.
R2-209(c) states that the statute of frauds "must be satisfied if the con-
tract as modified is subject to its provisions. '264 This language appears to
mean that the modification, plus the unmodified portion of the original
contract, are to be treated as a new contract. This new contract must
satisfy the statute of frauds if it is within the statute.265 That is, if it is a
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $5000 or more.266 The mod-
ification may satisfy the statute of frauds in a variety of ways, one of
which is an authenticated record.267 A key issue is whether this authenti-
cated record must contain all of the modified terms, or only those modi-
fied terms required to be in the writing by R2-201(a), such as a quantity
term. Under Current 2-209 and 2-201, the majority of courts require all
of the modified terms to be in a signed writing.268
The drafters' intent in Current Article 2 seems to have been to require
some written evidence of the modification, but not a writing that con-
tained all of the modified terms. The drafters apparently intended to re-
quire that the alleged modification be evidenced by a signed writing,
since their purpose in Current 2-209(3) was to guard against false allega-
tions of modification. 269 Further, Current 2-201(1) requires that the
signed writing at least "afford a basis for believing that the offered oral
262. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 3.
263. See White & Summers, supra note 29, at 54; see also Mark E. Roszkowski, Contract
Modification and the Statute of Frauds: Making Sense of Section 2-209 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 36 ALA. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1984).
264. U.C.C. § 2-209(c) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
265. Accord RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 149(1) cmt. a (1981).
266. The Revision increases the threshold amount for application of the statute of
frauds from $500 to $5,000. See U.C.C. § 2-201(a) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., Zemco Mfg., Inc., v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 815, 819-20
(7th Cir. 1999) (citing authorities on both sides of the issue).
269. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (West 1989); U.C.C. § 2-209 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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evidence rests on a real transaction. '270 Since the disputed transaction is
the alleged modification, it follows that the signed writing must at least
indicate that a modification was made. 271 The Current Comments and
their early drafts support this interpretation.272
The drafters, however, apparently did not intend to require that the
writing contain all of the modified terms.273 The writing must indicate
that a modification has been made and it must contain a quantity term, if
that term has been modified. The writing, however, can omit other modi-
fied terms and still satisfy the statute of frauds. For example, under this
approach, a claimed modification of delivery dates would presumably be
provable by oral testimony if the party to be charged had sent a signed
letter referring only to "the modified contract," even though the letter
did not contain any of the modified dates. The same letter would not
suffice to permit oral testimony of an alleged quantity modification.
Whatever may be the content of the writing required to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds for a modification, the waiver provisions of R2-209(d) and
(e) minimize the potential for injustice inherent in the enforcement of
this formal requirement.
270. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (West 1989) ("All that is required is that the writing afford a
basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction."). Current 2-
201(1) requires that the signed writing be "sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made .... Id. § 201(1).
271. It has been argued that an alleged modification of terms that does not change the
quantity term need not be in writing under Current 2-201(1). This argument is partially
correct. The only contract term Current 2-201(1) requires to be stated in writing is the
quantity term. See Zemco, 186 F.3d at 819 (discussing the minority rule). However, Cur-
rent 2-201(1) also requires the writing to evidence that the disputed transaction-the al-
leged modification-did occur. R2-201 retains this requirement.
272. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (West 1989) ("'Modification' for the future cannot there-
fore be conjured up by oral testimony if the price involved is $500.00 or more since such
modification must be shown by at least an authenticated memo.") (emphasis added). See
1948 Comments, supra note 9, Comment on Section 14 [2-6] Formal Requirements: Statute
of Frauds (1948), microformed on KARL N. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, file J-X(2)(e) (Win. Hein
& Co. 1987).
The changes embodied in the present section are concerned materially with the matters
involved in . . . [Current 2-209] on modification .... The dominant objectives of this
section are twofold: .... Second, and equally important as these matters have developed,
neither are allegations of change in regard to the unperformed terms of such a contract to
be admitted to a jury's consideration without the same guarantee of their soundness.
Formal Requirements: Statute of Frauds § 14 [2-6] at 1, 2 (1948), microformed on KARL N.
LLEWELLYN PAPERS, file J-X(2)(e) (Win. Hein & Co. 1987).
These older provisions gave little protection against perjury, particularly in the case of
fraudulent allegations of oral modifications of installment contracts. In such cases the ac-
ceptance or delivery of one installment was sufficient to open the door to parol testimony
as to an alleged oral modification of a contract continuing far into the future .... Under
this Act, on the other hand, the requirement of a note or memorandum is not eliminated by
any part performance except with respect to the part actually performed.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
273. See 1948 Comments, supra note 9, § 24 [2-15] Modification and Waiver (contrast-
ing the content of writings needed to satisfy the NOM clause and the statute of frauds:
"Such a [NOM] clause requires more than a memo within [the statute of frauds]. It re-
quires an adequate expression of the terms of the modification .... ")
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D. R2-209(D) [WAIVER OF NOM CLAUSES AND STATUTE
OF FRAUDS]
R2-209(d) is Current 2-209(4) without substantive change. It states
that "an attempt at modification or rescission" that does not satisfy the
requirements of a NOM clause or of the statute of frauds can operate as a
waiver.274 An "attempt at modification" apparently means a modifica-
tion that would have been effective but for its failure to satisfy the formal
requirements of a NOM clause or the statute of frauds.275 This provision
was included in Current 2-209 to protect against the danger of injustice
when a modification fails to satisfy formal requirements. 276 The provi-
sion makes two points. First, it establishes that a modification that is un-
enforceable because it does not satisfy formal requirements is not entirely
without effect.277 Second, it clarifies that the unenforceable modification
can be effective as a waiver. 278 Presumably, this means, at a minimum,
that terms in the original contract that are inconsistent with the terms in
the unenforceable modification are deleted from the contract, which is
the normal effect of a waiver. 279
Can an attempt at modification that operates as a waiver add a term to
the original contract or substitute a new term for the waived term?
Under Current 2-209(4), courts often permit this. 280 It could be argued
that the attempt at informal modification waives any formal requirements
so the informal modification becomes effective to substitute or add new
terms to the original contract. Revised Comment 4 appears to adopt this
view. This comment indicates that the formal requirement of an authen-
ticated record may be waived to enforce a new obligation to pay for extra
work not included in the original contract. 281 The comment also states
that the waiver may be express-such as by telling the other party that a
written change order is unnecessary-or implied from a party's conduct
274. U.C.C. § 2-209(d) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
275. Informal Appendix, supra note 246, at 12 (discussing section 25 [Current 2-209]:
"[S]ubsections 4 and 5 take care of the danger of injustice when a true modification fails to
satisfy any formal requirements.").
276. See id.
277. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) ("Subsection (d) is in-
tended, despite the provisions of subsections (b) and (c), to prevent statutory or contrac-
tual provisions precluding effective modification except by an authenticated record from
limiting in other respects the legal effect of the parties' actual later conduct.").
278. See id. § 2-209(d).
279. Cf. Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (7th Cir.
1986).
280. See Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 16 (1968);
J.W. Goodliffe & Son v. Odzer, 423 A.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Cf. Wiscon-
sin Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286 (rejecting the distinction between the removal of a term
from the original contract and the substitution of a new term for the purposes of applica-
tion of Current 2-209(4)). See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Res., Ltd., 40 F.3d
1474, 1492 (5th Cir. 1995); Moncrief v. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 880 F. Supp.
1495, 1520-21 (D. Wyo. 1995); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp. 154,
156 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (using waiver to increase or decrease the contract price); see also
Moldex, Inc. v. Ogden Eng'g Corp., 652 F. Supp. 584, 589-90 (D. Conn. 1987) (enforcing a
post sale express warranty).
281. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
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in requesting a modification. 282 It is not necessary that the words or con-
duct constituting the waiver specifically address the NOM clause. 283
Why should an informal modification that fails to satisfy formal re-
quirements have any effect at all? One reason is to minimize the poten-
tial for injustice inherent in the enforcement of formal requirements.
Experience suggests that parties to contracts often make informal modifi-
cation agreements that do not comply with either their NOM clauses or
with the statute of frauds. If one side has reasonably relied upon the
informal modification to its material detriment, it would be unfair to per-
mit the other side to avoid the modification by asserting the NOM clause
or the statute of frauds. Thus, R2-209(d) permits the NOM clause and
the statute of frauds to be waived by the parties' informal modification.2 84
Under R2-209(e), a material change of position in reliance on the
waiver-such as beginning to perform an informal modification-bars a
retraction of the waiver.285
E. R2-209(E) [WHEN WAIVER MAY BE RETRACTED]
R2-209(e) is Current 2-209(5) without substantive change. It states
that a waiver of an executory portion of the contract may be retracted,
unless the retraction would be unjust because one of the parties has mate-
rially changed its position in reliance on the waiver.286 This subsection
accomplishes two purposes. First, it minimizes the possibility of injustice
when a party relies on an unenforceable informal modification. Second,
this provision prevents a waiver from becoming irrevocable absent reli-
ance on the waiver.287 The cost of failing to satisfy formal requirements is
that the future effect of an informal modification can be undone and the
original contract reinstated on due notice, unless the reinstatement would
be unjust. 288
According to Revised Comment 5, this subsection is not intended to
disturb the doctrine of election waiver.289 This Comment also states that
the subsection covers both waivers of NOM clauses and the statute of
frauds under R2-209(d) 290 as well as waivers of other executory rights
under the contract. 291
282. See id.
283. See id. (disapproving the contrary holding in C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (CBC) 321 (Pa. C.P. 1965), affd, 214 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1965)).
284. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4, para. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
285. Id. § 2-209(e) cmt. 4.
286. Id. § 2-209(e).
287. Informal Appendix, supra note 246, at 12 (discussing section 25 [Current 2-209]:
"[S]ubsection 5 prevents the law of waiver from turning into a law of modification.").
288. 1948 Comments, supra note 9, § 24 [2-15] Modification and Waiver, at 7 ("[T]o
require a formality for a modification is of necessity to allow retraction of a waiver with
reference to the future, subject always to the qualification of reasonable notice and other
avoidance of injustice as provided in Subsection (5).").
289. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 5 (Proposed Revision 2000); see, e.g., John J. Calamari & Jo-
seph M. Perillo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 445-54 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing election waiver).
290. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4, para. 1 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
291. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 5.
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The decision to enforce alleged informal modifications, not as modifi-
cations but as waivers that can be retracted absent injustice, was a practi-
cal decision. Waivers can be retracted unilaterally.292 Modifications
cannot; they require mutual consent before they can be revoked. 293 By
treating informal modifications as waivers subject to retraction unless in-
justice would result, Current 2-209 and R2-209 chart a middle ground.
They avoid an inflexible all or nothing approach that would treat the in-
formal modification either as completely effective and irrevocable, or as
completely ineffective. Thus, revised subsections (d) and (e) protect
against false claims of modification unsupported by reliance, 294 while
preventing past favors granted from hardening into a right for the fu-
ture.295 Consequently, the flexible character of commercial contracts is
supported and encouraged. 296
292. See, e.g., Calamari and Perillo, supra note 289, at 445.
293. Id. Modifications are, themselves, agreements that require mutual assent to be
effective. See id. at n.12. R2-209(a) refers to a modification as "[aln agreement modifying
a contract." U.C.C. § 2-209(a) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). Revised Comment 3, fol-
lowing Current Comment 3, describes "modification" as a "change by mutual consent."
U.C.C. § 2-209(a) cmt. 3 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000); see U.C.C. § 2-209(a) cmt. 3
(West 1989).
294. Perjurers are unlikely to incur costs in purported reliance on a non-existent modifi-
cation. See Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1287.
295. Cf. General Comment, supra note 55, at 1268.
The question is immediately raised as to whether such conduct represents a
favor, through a unilateral waiver of a term, or a right implicit in the contract
and being recognized in the course of performance. Good faith forbids that
favors should be turned into unalterable rights and certainty demands that
fair doubts should be resolved in favor of explicit terms.
Id. at 1267-68.
Where practical construction of a flexible commercial contract results in a
departure from the literal language of the original agreement which has been
shaped and changed by the course of the parties' performance or by a single
crucial act of one party .... the original agreement can be recurred to and the
performance required can be tightened up upon due notice. When there is
doubt as to the meaning and effect of the parties' actions in the course of
performance, this Act favors that interpretation which stresses the concept of
a waiver of a term under [Current 2-208]. For [Current 2-2091 further pro-
vides that unless reliance on such a waiver makes its retraction unjust, it is
open to retraction with regard to all executory portions of the contract.
Good faith action and expectation are thus protected while flexibility is pre-
served, not only in the direction of leeway of performance (by action and
acquiescence) but also in the direction of tightening up (by due notice given).
Id. at 1271-72.
296. See id. at 126S.
Actually most commercial obligations have a flexible character which our
legal vocabulary has had some trouble in grasping but which has always been
reflected in the spirit of the better commercial cases. They represent a going
relationship not rigidly defined at the moment of contracting but changing in
shape and structure in the process of performance or of getting ready to per-
form or to fit supervening circumstances. The available legal concepts tend
to flow into one another: the use of the circumstances and the parties' actions
to interpret the terms; the exercise of an option within an agreed range;
waiver in any of its aspects and even modification of a term.
Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 3 (West 1989).
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IX. REVISED 2-210. ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS; DELEGATION
OF PERFORMANCE
He who binds to himself a joy
does the winged life destroy;
but he who kisses a joy as it flies
lives in eternity's sunrise.
-William Blake
R2-210 states rules governing the assignment of rights and the delega-
tion of duties under contracts of sale. There are no substantial changes
from the provisions of Current 2-210. The Revision, however, reorgan-
izes these provisions and adds some new provisions. Revised subsection
(a) covers assignment; revised subsection (b) covers delegation; and re-
vised subsections (c) and (d) are rules of construction for contract clauses
that assign or prohibit the assignment of the contract in general terms.
R2-210 "is not intended to be a complete statement of assignment and
delegation law; it is limited to clarifying some issues doubtful under the
case law."'2 97 Issues that are not covered in R2-210 are left to the com-
mon law.298
A. R2-210(A): ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
1. R 2-210(a)(1) [Assignments: When Rights May Be Assigned]
R2-210(a)(1) states when contract rights may be assigned. This subsec-
tion is essentially the text of Current 2-210(2) with added references to
subsection (a)(2) and section 9-406. These references cite to new provi-
sions that clarify the circumstances in which sellers or buyers may assign
their rights on sale contracts as collateral in secured transactions.
R2-210(a)(1) provides that "contract rights are freely assignable, unless
otherwise agreed, or unless the assignment of rights would materially in-
crease the burden or risk to the other party to the original contract. '2 99
a. Effect of Contract Clauses that Prohibit Assignment
Contract clauses that prohibit assignment are permissible; however,
R2-210(a)(1) renders such clauses unenforceable in three instances. First,
a damage claim is assignable despite a clause prohibiting assignment. 300
Second, any right earned by the assignor's due performance of the whole
contract may be assigned despite a clause prohibiting assignment. 301 Sup-
pose the rights assigned have not yet been earned by performance of the
whole contract? If the rights assigned are covered by R9-409(d), 302 a
297. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 6 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
298. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (West 1989).
299. U.C.C. § 2-210(a)(1) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. References to Revised Article 9 sections are preceded by "R." Revised Article 9
will become effective in many states on July 1, 2001. Similarly, references to current Arti-
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clause prohibiting their assignment might be ineffective. 30 3 If the rights
are not covered by R9-409(d), nothing in R2-210 invalidates a clause
prohibiting the assignment. However, since R2-210 does not purport to
be a "complete statement of the law of assignments," 30 4 one should look
to the common law.30 5
Third, a clause prohibiting assignment might be rendered unenforce-
able by R9-406(d). 306 The purpose of this subsection is to protect the
value of contract rights by permitting their assignment as collateral de-
spite a clause barring assignment. 30 7 R9-406(d) applies when: (1) the
seller or the buyer assigns its rights on the sale contract as collateral in a
secured transaction, and (2) the assigned rights are classified as an ac-
count,308 chattel paper,30 9 payment intangible,310 or promissory note3 1
under Revised Article 9. For these kinds of secured transactions, R9-
406(d) invalidates a clause prohibiting assignment-thereby validating
the use of contract rights as collateral-unless the secured transaction is
an outright sale of a promissory note or a payment intangible, 312 or unless
a consumer protection statute validates the clause prohibiting
assignment. 313
What is the effect of an assignment that violates a clause prohibiting
assignment when the clause is ineffective under one of the three instances
just discussed? If the anti-assignment clause is made ineffective by R9-
406(d), Comment 5 to this section states that the assignment is effective
and no one has any remedies for violation of the clause.314 If the anti-
assignment clause is made ineffective by R2-210(a)(1), Comment 2 to R2-
cle 9 sections are preceded by "Current." See infra text accompanying notes 306-13 (dis-
cussing the scope of R9-406(d)).
303. See infra text accompanying note 314.
304. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 6 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
305. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (West 1989).
306. See U.C.C. § 2-210(a)(1) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) ("except as otherwise
provided in Section 9-406").
307. R9-406(d) continues the policy of Current 9-318(4). See § 9-406 cmt. 5 (Proposed
Revision Nov. 2000); see also U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 4 (West 1989) (stating the current policy
eloquently).
308. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000) (providing a definition of "Ac-
count"). For example, if the seller uses its right to the price as collateral, that right is an
"account," if the right to the price is not itself secured.
309. Id. § 9-102(11) (providing a definition of "Chattel Paper"). For example, if the
seller uses its right to the price as collateral, that right is a "chattel paper," if the right to
the price is itself secured by the goods sold.
310. Id. § 9-102(65) (providing a definition of "Payment Intangible"). For example, in a
contract for the sale of patented goods, the seller might be entitled to licensing or royalty
payments. If the seller were to use its right to these payments as collateral, the rights
would be "payment intangibles."
311. Id. § 9-102(65) (providing a definition of "Promissory Note"); see also id. § 9-
102(47) (providing a definition of "Instrument'). For example, if the seller uses its right to
the price as collateral, that right is a "promissory note," if the right is evidenced by a
negotiable note signed by the buyer.
312. Such outright sales are deemed secured transactions. See id. § 9-109(a)(3). R9-
406(d), however, does not apply to them. U.C.C. § 9-406(e) (Proposed Revision Nov.
2000).
313. Id. § 9-409(h).
314. Id. § 9-406 cmt. 5.
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210 states that the assignment is effective, but that the other party to the
original contract might recover damages for breach of the clause.315 This
comment states that the assignment might also create grounds for insecu-
rity, thus permitting the other party to the original contract to demand
adequate assurance of performance from the assignor under R2-609. 316
b. Assignments That Adversely Affect the Other Party
R2-210(a)(1) states that contract rights may not be assigned if "the as-
signment would materially change the duty of the other party, increase
materially the burden or risk imposed on that party by the contract, or
impair materially that party's chance of obtaining return perform-
ance. '317 This standard is inherited from Current 2-210(2). Comment 2
to R2-210 states that this standard will rarely be satisfied, but provides
two examples of when it might be fulfilled.318 R2-210(a)(2) clarifies the
application of this standard to security interests. It states that a seller
may grant a security interest in its contract rights without breaching this
standard, but that enforcement of the security interest could breach this
standard.319
2. R2-210(a)(2) [Assignments: When Creation, Perfection, or
Enforcement of Security Interest in Seller's Interest in the
Contract Materially Increases Buyer's Risk]
R2-210(a)(2) is new. It derives from U.C.C. 2A-303(3) and a con-
forming amendment to Current 2-210, which is part of the Revision of
U.C.C. Article 9. It clarifies the seller's ability to use its contract rights as
collateral in a secured transaction. Contract rights are an important
source of financing for the seller, yet the buyer could be adversely af-
fected by such financing. Thus, this subsection strikes a balance that per-
mits the seller to use its rights in the sale contract as collateral as long as
the buyer is not materially adversely affected by enforcement of the se-
cured creditor's rights in the collateral.
R2-210(a)(2) states that the creation, perfection, or enforcement of a
security interest in the seller's interest in the contract is not per se an
assignment that triggers the materially adverse change provision of R2-
210(a)(1). 320 Thus, the seller can finance its interest in the contract with-
out fear of triggering this provision. Any enforcement of the security in-
terest that results in the delegation of a material performance of the
seller, however, is an adverse material change to the buyer under R2-
210(a)(1). 32 1
315. Id. § 2-210(a)(1) cmt. 2 (citing U.C.C. § 2A-303 (West 1989)).
316. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 2 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
317. Id. § 2-210(a)(1).
318. Id. § 2-210 cmt. 2.





What are the consequences of a security interest enforcement that re-
sults in a material adverse change to the buyer? R2-210(a)(2) states that
the perfection and enforcement of the security interest remain effec-
tive.32 2 The buyer may, however, recover damages caused by the delega-
tion or may seek other appropriate relief, including cancellation of the
contract or an injunction against enforcement of the security interest.323
If an assignment that results in a materially adverse delegation under this
subsection also falls under R9-406(f)-such as if the rights assigned con-
stitute accounts or chattel paper-the buyer's rights to damages or an
injunction under R2-210(a)(2) might be extinguished by R9-406(f)(2). 324
B. R2-210(B): DELEGATION OF DUTIES
1. R2-210(b)(1) [Delegation: When Duties May Be Delegated. Effect
of Delegation on Delegator's Duty to Perform]
R2-210(b)(1) is Current 2-210(1) with slight, non-substantive re-phras-
ing. It explains when duties to perform under the contract may be dele-
gated and the effect of a delegation on the delegator's duty to perform
the contract.
According to this subsection, a duty may be delegated, unless other-
wise agreed, or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having
the original promisor perform the duty.
Delegation does not relieve the delegator of either its duty to perform
or its liability for breach if the duty is not duly performed. Comment 4 to
R2-210 indicates that if the person entitled to performance agrees to sub-
stitute the delegatee for the delegator (a novation agreement), the dele-
gator is relieved of its duty to perform.
2. R2-210(b)(2) [Delegation: Liability of Delegatee for Non-
Performance of Delegated Duty]
R2-210(b)(2) is the last clause of the first sentence and the second sen-
tence of Current 2-210(4) without substantive change. It covers the dele-
gate's liability if the delegated duty is not duly performed. According to
this subsection, the acceptance of a delegation of duties by one to whom
duties have been delegated (the delegatee) constitutes a promise by the
delegatee to perform the delegated duties.325 The provision also states
that this promise may be enforced either by the delegator, or by the other
party to the original contract.
322. U.C.C. § 2-210(a)(2) (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000).
323. Id.
324. Id. § 2-102(e) indicating that Revised Article 2 provisions yield to provisions of
other Articles in case of conflict.
325. Comment 4 to R2-210 characterizes the delegatee's promise as a third party bene-
ficiary contract. U.C.C. § 2-210, cmt. 4 (Proposed Revision Nov. 2000). The person to




3. R2-210(b) (3) [Delegation: Any Delegation Creates Reasonable
Grounds for Insecurity]
R2-210(b)(3) is Current 2-210(5) with a slight change. It states that any
delegation of duties creates reasonable grounds for insecurity in the party
to whom the delegated duty is owed. That party may, without prejudicing
its rights against the delegator, demand adequate assurance of perform-
ance under R2-609 from the person to whom the duties have been dele-
gated (the delegatee). Thus, a demand for assurances made upon the
delegatee would not constitute a novation or otherwise relieve the dele-
gator of liability. If adequate assurance is not forthcoming, the delegator
is deemed to have repudiated the contract.326
4. R2-210(b)(4) [Contract Term Prohibiting Delegation Bars Effective
Delegation]
R2-210(b)(4) is new. It states that a contract term prohibiting delega-
tion is enforceable and that an attempted delegation violating this term is
not effective. Presumably, the effect of this subsection is that a party who
has included an anti-delegation clause in its contract need not accept per-
formance of the contract by anyone except the person who was to per-
form originally.
C. R2-210 (c) & (D): RULES OF CONSTRUCrION
1. R2-210(c) [Construction of Clause Assigning "the Contract" or "All
My Rights Under the Contract"]
R2-210(c) is the first sentence of Current 2-210(4), without the last
clause. There is no substantive change, as the missing clause has been
moved to R2-210(b)(2). R2-210(c) states a rule of construction; as such
the subsection provides that it yields to the parties' intent, as manifested
by their language or the circumstances. Under this rule of construction, a
clause assigning rights in general terms, such as an assignment of "the
contract" or of "all my rights under the contract," is to be construed as
both an assignment of rights and a delegation of the assignor's contract
duties.327 If the assignment, however, is for security only-such as when
the seller assigns its contract rights as collateral in a secured transaction-
the assignment is not construed to include delegation of the assignor's
duties.
2. R2-210(d) [Clause Prohibiting Assignment of "the Contract" Bars
Only Delegation of Performance]
R2-210(d) is Current 2-210(3) without change. This provision is an-
other rule of construction that yields to the parties' manifested actual in-
tent. Under this rule of construction, a clause prohibiting an assignment
326. See id. § 2-609(d).
327. Id. § 2-210(c).
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of "the contract" bars only delegation of the assignor's performance. The
implication of this provision is that such language does not bar an assign-
ment of rights under the contract. Thus, this provision reflects the normal
commercial expectation that rights under a contract for the sale of goods
are freely assignable, unless the contract clearly prohibits an assignment
of those rights.
Comment
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